I don't much like Kant.... even less than I like Descartes...Mr. Joseph Polanik.
http://groups.google.com/group/epistemology/browse_thread/thread/e716760b69f3405?q=a+posteriori+or+when+to+wipe+your+ass Working Title. "A posteriori, or when to wipe your ass" I have been having a discussion, on another board with a certain poster regarding... among other things, epsitemology.... Dear nom-- Have you published a book? I do believe you have to a) have written a book, and b) had it published, before it can be banned. Not that I don't know people for whom _a priori_ banning seems desirable. --Diana www.dianagabaldon.com As you can see from the above, the said poster appears to be a Phenomenologist when it comes to epistemology.... the telltale is her use of the term.... "a priori". For those who may not know it, that term was used to best effect by the philosopher Emmanuel Kant, probably the originator or best exponent of Phenomenology. Here's a definition of ... a priori.... below: A proposition is knowable a priori iff one could be justified in believing it on the basis of reason alone. If experience must in some way enter into the justification, it is said to be only knowable a posteriori. www.shef.ac.uk/~phil/other/philterms.html As you see.... a priori.... generally means something which is known in and of itself.... without recourse to experience. Kant went a bit further than this....he posited that there were.... a priori forms of intuition, such as "time" and "space" ... which were totally independent of experience or "empirical" touch and feel things or matter. Kant carried this notion of .... a priori.... to assert that there existed "pure thoughts of objects in general" with the emphasis on the "thoughts" .... irrespective of the objects as matter. Kant also carried this notion of ... a priori... forward to assert that "pure intellectual concepts are not derived from sense experience", but instead that it is the other way around.... sense experience "phenomenon" (according to the Phenomenologists) are all "subjective" appearances that must be "categorized" into one or more of these "pure" concepts. In this way, for the Phenomenologist, the concept is the "perfect" epistemologically objective aspect to which the imperfect subjective matter must be reconciled. Me, as a nominalist, I believe that this is totally misguided. I think that it is the other way around.... nothing can be known by a conscious mind.... a priori (prior to experience).... everything must be learned by the thinking mind, instead.... a posteriori ( after experience)..... The concept aspect, to my nominalist thinking is subjective and it is only valid to the extent that, empirically, it actually serves to explain or account for the workings of the matter aspect. Let me get to my humorous metaphor.... Question: If you take a crap.... at what point do you wipe your ass? Do you wipe your ass.... a priori....? Or do you wipe your ass..... a posteriori? Answer, Phenomenologist: If you know that you are going to take a crap eventually and you are a "brainy" "sanitary" phenomenologist you may think to yourself.... Ha, I have this "a priori" concept of taking a crap.... so I will now wipe my ass beforehand and perfectly deal with the situation. (Idealists can be the same as phenomenologists when it comes to matter). Answer, Nominalist: The nominalist, on the other hand, knows through experience that when he feels certain sensations in his bowels.... he is about to take a crap.... which the nominalist proceeds to do. After which "experience" the "sanitary" nominalist then proceeds to wipe his ass. (Materialists can be the same as nominalists when it comes to matter). So.... the difference is that even "sanitary" phenomenologists have the tendency to go through life with a stinkin', "crappy ass" whereas "sanitary" nominalists always have a non-odorous, "clean ass".... Maybe in another post I can deal with the issue of teaching phenomenologists the difference between their asses and a hole in the ground.... nominal9 On Nov 10, 6:52 am, Joseph Polanik <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Reason Lover wrote: > > >Kant's criticism of Descartes is off target if he considered the Cogito > >to be a modus ponens or syllogism. I don't believe Descartes intended > >it that way at all. > > Descartes denied that he acquired his knowledge this way; but, since he > stated it in the _Principles of Philosophy_ which he intended to be used > as a teaching text, it is hard to escape the conclusion that it would be > taught that way. > > >But since I don't disagree with Kant's critical method, I won't > >disagree with his anti-Cartesian argument in terms of his own > >interpretation, the purpose of which was to judge transcendentally > >whether or not knowledge of the soul's nature was possible at all as > >conditioned by the sensibility and then determined by the > >understanding. > > but is that really an accurate description of the outcome of Kant's > analysis? based on the quote included with my previous post, it seems to > me that Kant was saying that I, this instance of self-awareness, am not > able to know (from the fact of self-awareness alone) either that > self-awareness is a phenomenon produced by a brain or by a soul. > > >You say Descartes' argument is irrefutably true. But Kant would say > >that it is true only analytically, and as such it adds nothing to our > >knowledge. And that of course is how Kant pursued this line of > >critique. But it adds nothing, not merely because it is circular and > >empty, but because there is a hidden, underlying assumption Kant > >believed was present in the argument: that the soul can serve as an > >object of contemplation for the understanding. This he called a > >paralogism. > > when you say that the Experiento is 'true only analytically' are you > suggesting that it is false in some other way or that it is > uninformative or something else? > > after concluding that 'I am' is a true statement, one may try to > discover whether I, this instance of self-awareness, is a phenomenon > produced by soul or by brain or both or something(s) else. > > however, it is difficult see how Kant found hidden in the simple > statement 'I am' the rather complex assumption 'the soul can serve as an > object of contemplation for the understanding'. > > it seems to me that all we can say (after learning or deciding that 'I > am' is necessarily true) is 'I know that I am; but, not what I am'. > Descartes then proceeds to try to discover whether the I that > necessarily is is a body or a soul. > > Joe > > -- > Philosophy is, after all, done ultimately in the first person for the > first person. --- H-N Castaneda > > @[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@ > http://what-am-i.net > @[EMAIL PROTECTED]@^@ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Epistemology" group. 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