In a message dated 99-07-25 19:43:43 EDT, Hal Finney writes: << Maudlin's change (adding an inert block) makes consciousness go away (even assuming computationalism) is a fallacy. >>
I agree with Hal that Maudlin's move leads to a fallacy, but for different reason. Maudlin's move reminds me of the famous Maxwell's demon thought experiment in which the entropy of a system could be lowered by a demon. The experimental system comprises two chambers A and B filled with gas and separated by a thin membrane. In the middle of the membrane, there is a door operated by the demon. When the demon sees a molecule from side A coming toward the opening he opens the door. However he closes the door when he sees a molecule coming from side B. The end results is that all the gas moves from side A to side B. Entropy is lowered. the Second Law is violated. The resolution of the paradox is simply that the demon must be considered part of the system, and that his entropy has increased. Similarly, the insertion of the piece of wood in the computer must be done by someone. Let's call that someone Maudlin's demon. Deciding what the right place and the right time is to make the wood irrelevent to the thinking process, in order to satisfy the counterfactual role that the wood must play, requires Maudlin's demon to think. Maudlin's demon then becomes part of the computer's consciousness just like the subject in the chinese room experiment becomes a cog in the chinese room ability to speak chinese. In the end, I am a strong sceptic of both computationalism and physical supervenience. I believe that consciousness exists only in the eyes of the beholder, and is a relativistic property, based on the relativity of (mutual) information as defined by Claude Shannon. George
