On 27 Mar -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques Mallah wrote:
> > Bruno, I think it is now abundently clear that Maudlin's paper
> >does not rule out physical computationalism, and other people on the list
> >have seen that as well.
>
> Clear would be enough. Abundently clear is a little to much.
OK, 'obvious' is enough.
> I don't understand what really means 'physical' in physical
> computationalism.
> It is clear that we have not the same primitive elements.
> I believe in numbers and number's dreams. Some dreams are deep and
> partially sharable among UTMs, those are their relative realities.
>
> I appreciate the everythinger's work on these questions, and I guess it
> is not easy to abandon the physical supervenience thesis.
As I've said, it works the same whether there is a physical world
described by math, or any other mathematical stucture, in terms of what is
needed to find computations that are implemented.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Graduate Student / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL: http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
