Hi Jesse Mazer,
>>I agree that I say something shocking. At each instant
>>I am not multiplied by 10^100 like in deWitt's view of Everett
>>formulation of QM, I show that with comp we are multiplied
>>a priori by 2^aleph_0, at each instant ...
>I don't understand how you get this. If at time T1 I am duplicated, and
>then at time T2 I am duplicated again, then at T2 there will be 4 of me, but
>that doesn't mean that at time T1 I was being "multiplied a priori" by 4,
>does it? At time T1 I was only multiplied by 2.
You are right. But the universal dovetailer (UD) really multiply you
by aleph_0, each belonging to 2^aleph_0 infinite computations.
The key point is that the DU, which emulate all programs, build you again
and again, and again ... and you cannot be aware of
the (rather big) delays between your (virtual) reconstitutions.
Have you read my post http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html.
>Likewise, if it is possible to experience an infinite number of distinct
>instants, then if I am duplicated at each instant, you could say that there
>are 2^aleph_0 of me after I have experienced aleph_0 instants...but as long
>as I have only experienced a finite number of instants, there will be only a
>finite number of me. And I don't think it's possible to actually experience
>an infinite number of distinct instants, at least not if your mind is
Like you, I don't think it is possible to experience an infinite number
of distinct instants. But I belief that the probability of your *next*
first person state depend on those infinite third person rebuilding made