>> Let us suppose I am duplicated. I am annihilated at Brussels and
>> recontituted at both Washington and Moscow.
>> By comp I survive. I cannot predict with certainty where I will feel
>> myself (1-person point of view) after the experiment.
>> So there is an uncertainty on the domain of reconstitution. OK ?
>Why repeat this over and over? This is the very reason why one has to
>look at possible probability distributions over possible futures to
>quantify the uncertainty.
>If the distribution is computable or at least describable then you
>get results such as in http://rapa.idsia.ch/~juergen/toesv2
>Otherwise you cannot even describe it. Case closed.
You are confusing computationalism and constructivism in mathematics.
My godelian reconstruction of Lucas (Penrose) Argument, which BTW I got
in the seventies, shows that "if I am a machine then I cannot know
(still less prove) which machine I am". This reconstruction has been
obtained, with different level of rigor, by Benaceraff, Reinhardt and
many others. Ref. and history in my thesis, and in my CCQ paper.
(Completely detailed story in my 1994 technical report).
It is just impossible to be consistently computationalist and
constructivist. Case closed (as you say).
A mathematical object can be constructed in a bottom up way, but
it can also be isolate in a top down way, and what I have shown
is that with comp it can *only* be isolated in a top down way.