> It seems we're losing track of the original objection, which is to say that:
> 1. everything exists (all relationships are equally valid, all worlds
> exists, you can string 'snapshots in time' together any way you wish - with
> a glass unsmashing or whatever - and all are equally likeley, as all exist
> with a probability off one.)
But of course they are NOT equally likely (a major point of the 1997 paper).
> and 2. WAP (we see a stable environment suited to us because we otherwise
> wouldn't be here to see it).
> ...seem to explain the entire universe, except in that there's nothing
> stopping temporary minor abberations such as a flying rabbit.
To repeat, given the universal Solomonoff-Levin distribution U, the simple
universes (those with short algorithms) are much more likely. That's
why flying rabbits are so improbable.