Good grief - Jacques said it often enough (F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense!
Charles Goodwin wrote: > > Thank you for the explanation. I think FIN stands for something derogatory - >possibly invented by Jaques Mallah (in much the way > that Fred Hoyle coined the term 'Big Bang' to make his opponents' views sound >ridiculous, or art critics coined 'Cubism' for similar > reasons, only to see the derisively-termed ideas go on to achieve fame while the >original reason for the name was forgotten). The > "IN" part of FIN is (I think) "Immortality Nonsense" - the "F" I'm not sure about >although some ideas come to mind . . . so anyway, > it *is* another name for QTI. > > I think the idea of continuity of consciousness between duplicates, no matter how >widely separated in space, time or the multiverse, > assumes that they are (at least momentarily) in the same quantum state. According to >quantum theory this means that they are > literally identical, as atoms in a Bose-Einstein condensate are identical - there is >no test, even in theory, that will distinguish > them. > > The MWI postulates that the initial state of some system evolves through the >schrodinger wave eqn to a continuum of derived states, > and hence that a person (for example) is continuously becoming an (uncountably >infinite) number of copies, all of which have > continuity of consciousness with the original. > > Of these outcomes, we typically experience the most likely, which is to say that our >experiences are normally of the laws of physics > holding, including probablistic 'laws' like thermodynamics. There are SOME copies of >me who are experiencing their PCs turning into > a bowl of petunias, or all the air molecules rushing out of the room, but the >chances that you will be getting an email from one of > them rather than one in which things go on as normal is very unlikely - >"thermodynamically unlikely". > > As I understand the QTI (from your post and others) it goes on to postulate that in >the event of imminent death (including the > infamous "quantum suicide" experiment) we would start to experience *unlikely* >outcomes, because in all the likely ones we'd die > (which we wouldn't experience for the reasons you mention below). So if in a fit of >depression I try to shoot myself, the QTI > suggests that I would experience the most likely outcome that provides continuity of >consciousness. (This reminds me of a Larry > Niven story in which a race of aliens discovered the meaning of life (I forget how >they managed this) and promptly committed suicide > en masse.) Of course the most likely outcome that provides continuity of >consciousness is unlikely to be pleasant: if I shot myself, > I'd probably experience acquiring very bad injuries (and doctors exclaiming in >delight over the opportunity to work out how someone > can survive with half his head missing). > > The QTI assumes that the possibility of identical quantum states arising for any >arbitrary collection of matter is 100% - which is > true in the MWI (or any infinite collection of space-time slices which have the same >laws of physics). So it actually seems at least > a possible theory, given certain assumptions - but not easily testable in the sense >that most theories try to be (i.e. "third person > testable", so to speak). > > Charles > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Friday, 7 September 2001 7:21 a.m. > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: RE: FIN insanity > > > > > > >From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >Subject: RE: FIN insanity > > >Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 12:26:24 +1200 > > > > >On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I > > >*think* the argument runs something like this... > > > > > >Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb dropped on you, > > there's still > > >SOME outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation which just > > >happen to lead to you suriviving the explosion. Although > > these are VERY > > >unlikely - less likely than, say, my computer turning into a > > >bowl of petunias - they do exist, and (given the MWI) they > > occur somewhere > > >in the multiverse. For some reason I can't work out, all > > >the copies who are killed by the bomb don't count. Only the > > very very very > > >(etc) small proportion who miraculously survive do, and > > >these are the only ones you personally experience. > > > > > >Is that a reasonable description of FIN? Ignoring > > statistical arguments, > > >what is wrong with it? > > > > > >Charles > > > > What does FIN stand for, anyway? Is it just another version > > of the quantum > > theory of immortality? Anyway, the idea behind the QTI is not > > just that we > > arbitrarily decide copies who die "don't count," rather it > > has to do with > > some supplemental assumptions about the "laws" governing first-person > > experience, namely: > > > > 1. Continuity of consciousness is real (see my recent post on this) > > > > 2. Continuity of consciousness does not depend on spatial or temporal > > continuity, only on some kind of "pattern continuity" between > > different > > observer moments. > > > > I won't try to explain #1 any more for now, but I'll try > > explaining #2 > > (Bruno Marchal is much better at this sort of thing). > > Basically, you want to > > imagine something like a star trek transporter, which > > disassembles me at one > > location and reassembles me at another. Will this mean that > > the original > > version of me "died" and that a doppelganger with false > > memories was created > > in his place? If computationalism/functionalism is true, it > > would seem the > > answer is no--who "I" am is a function of my pattern, not the > > particular > > particles I'm made of, so as long as the pattern is preserved > > my continuity > > of consciousness will be too (and after all, the molecules of > > my body all > > end up being totally replaced by new ones every few years > > anyway). But if > > this is true, the spatial/temporal separation of the two transporter > > chambers shouldn't matter--the imaging chamber could be on > > 21st century > > earth and the replication chamber in the Andromeda Galaxy in > > the year 5000, > > and I would still have a continuous experience of stepping > > into the imaging > > chamber and instantaneously finding myself in the replication > > chamber, > > wherever/whenever that may be. > > > > A naturally corrolary of this is that my stream of > > consciousness can be > > "split"--if there are two replication chambers which create > > copies of me > > just as I was when I stepped into the imaging chamber, then > > "I" before the > > experiment could experience becoming either of the two > > copies. All other > > things being equal, it seems reasonable to assume the chances of > > experiencing becoming one copy vs. the other are 50/50. But > > now suppose we > > do a similar duplication experiment, except we forget to plug > > in the second > > replication chamber, so only one "copy" is created. Should I > > assume that I > > have a 50% chance of becoming the real copy and a 50% chance > > of "finding > > myself" in an empty chamber, and thus being "dead?" That > > doesn't seem to > > make sense--after all, a duplication experiment where one > > chamber fails to > > create a copy is just like a standard Star-Trek-style > > transporter, and I > > assume that in that case I have a 100% chance of finding > > myself as the > > single "copy." But it's easy to imagine extending > > this--suppose instead of > > failing to replicate anything, the second chamber replicates > > a copy of my > > body with the brain totally scrambled, so that the body dies > > pretty rapidly. > > Do I have a 50% chance of dying in this experiment because I > > become the copy > > with the scrambled brain? If only "pattern continuity" is > > important, the > > fact that this copy has a body which resembles mine shouldn't > > matter, its > > brain-pattern doesn't resemble mine in any way so there's no > > reason I should > > become that copy. > > > > It's not too hard to see how all this would be analogous to > > what would be > > happening all the time in a MWI-style multiverse. Why should > > I "become" > > those copies of me who experience death in various possible > > histories? There > > shouldn't be any more danger of that than there is of me > > suddenly "becoming" > > the dead body of a complete stranger, or of finding myself in > > a universe > > where I was never born in the first place and being "dead" > > for that reason. > > So, that's the basic argument for "quantum immortality." The > > catch is in > > defining exactly what "pattern continuity" here means--what > > if a copy is > > replicated that's basically the same as me but with a few > > neurons scrambled, > > for example? Something like that happens every time I have a > > new experience, > > so it shouldn't make too much of a difference. But it's > > possible to imagine > > a continuum of cases where the pattern is more and more > > altered, until > > eventually the guy who comes out the other side is a totally > > different > > person from me, so presumably I don't have a significant chance of > > "becoming" him (although the probability of this might not be > > zero, either). > > I think questions like these show the need for some kind of > > "theory of > > consciousness" to quantify this stuff and give a specific conditional > > probability distribution for transitions from one observer-moment to > > another. I am sure others on this list would have very > > different opinions > > about what these thought-experiments show, though--some, like > > Jaques Mallah, > > might consider them a reductio ad absurdum of the whole concept of > > "continuity of consciousness." > > > > Jesse > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at > http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Russell Standish Director High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile) UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (") Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED] Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
