I see that according to you Hal Ruhl qualifies as a copy of Hal Finney. ----- Oorspronkelijk bericht ----- Van: "jamikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> CC: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Verzonden: zondag 9 september 2001 15:06 Onderwerp: Immortality
> As much as I enjoyed last years's discussions in worldview speculations, I > get frustrated by the lately emerged word-playing about concepts used in > just different contents from the conventional. > > May I submit a (trivial) proof for immortality in this sense: > > Death (of others, meaning not only persons) is a 3rd person (fantasy?), > either true or imagined. NOBODY ever experienced his/her own death and the > "time" after such, so "immortality" is the only thing in consciousness. The > world (experienceable worldview) does not include otherwise. > > To the forgotten things existing in another (branch of?) world: > If I 'forgot' something: that dose not necessarily build another world of > those things I forgot. Alzheimer patients are not the most efficient > Creators. > And please do not 'rationalize' about 'near death' and similar fantasies in > this respect. > > Excuse my out-of-topic remark to the topic. > > John Mikes > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 6:30 AM > Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False > > > > Hal Finney wrote: > > Saibal writes: > > > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can > > > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a > > > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a > > > long time ago. > > > > Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say, > > you don't believe this because you have died. But this is not possible. > > So the analogy is not as good as it looks. You do exist in branches where > > you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them. > > That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive > with memory loss have to be taken into account. > > In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more > likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the > disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter > possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just > because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. > > You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow > transferred to a different person (you ``jump�� to a different branch that > separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say > that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person > would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the > disease. > > Saibal > > >
