I see that according to you Hal Ruhl qualifies as a copy of Hal Finney.

----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
Van: "jamikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CC: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Verzonden: zondag 9 september 2001 15:06
Onderwerp: Immortality

> As much as I enjoyed last years's discussions in worldview speculations, I
> get frustrated by the lately emerged word-playing about concepts used in
> just different contents from the conventional.
>  May I submit a (trivial) proof for immortality in this sense:
> Death (of others, meaning not only persons) is a 3rd person (fantasy?),
> either true or imagined. NOBODY ever experienced his/her own death and the
> "time" after such, so "immortality" is the only thing in consciousness.
> world (experienceable worldview) does not include otherwise.
> To the forgotten things existing in another (branch of?) world:
> If I 'forgot' something: that dose not necessarily build another world of
> those things I forgot. Alzheimer patients are not the most efficient
> Creators.
> And please do not 'rationalize' about 'near death' and similar fantasies
> this respect.
> Excuse my out-of-topic remark to the topic.
> John Mikes
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 6:30 AM
> Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False
> Hal Finney wrote:
> > Saibal writes:
> > > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you
> > > also never forget anything. I don't believe  this because I know for a
> > > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
> > > long time ago.
> >
> > Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say,
> > you don't believe this because you have died.  But this is not possible.
> > So the analogy is not as good as it looks.  You do exist in branches
> > you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember
> That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive
> with memory loss have to be taken into account.
> In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more
> likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with
> disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter
> possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just
> because the surviving person is more similar to the original person.
> You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
> transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that
> separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would
> that the surviving person has the same consciousness  the original person
> would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the
> disease.
> Saibal

Reply via email to