As much as I enjoyed last years's discussions in worldview speculations, I get frustrated by the lately emerged word-playing about concepts used in just different contents from the conventional.
May I submit a (trivial) proof for immortality in this sense: Death (of others, meaning not only persons) is a 3rd person (fantasy?), either true or imagined. NOBODY ever experienced his/her own death and the "time" after such, so "immortality" is the only thing in consciousness. The world (experienceable worldview) does not include otherwise. To the forgotten things existing in another (branch of?) world: If I 'forgot' something: that dose not necessarily build another world of those things I forgot. Alzheimer patients are not the most efficient Creators. And please do not 'rationalize' about 'near death' and similar fantasies in this respect. Excuse my out-of-topic remark to the topic. John Mikes ----- Original Message ----- From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, September 09, 2001 6:30 AM Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False Hal Finney wrote: > Saibal writes: > > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can > > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a > > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a > > long time ago. > > Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say, > you don't believe this because you have died. But this is not possible. > So the analogy is not as good as it looks. You do exist in branches where > you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them. That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive with memory loss have to be taken into account. In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow transferred to a different person (you ``jump�� to a different branch that separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the disease. Saibal
