> -----Original Message-----
> From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it
> is much more
> likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not
> diagnosed with the
> disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically
> cured. The latter
> possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just
> because the surviving person is more similar to the original person.

I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both 
branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite
number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in 
which he survives tends to zero - but that is
because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person 
survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments
are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity.

> You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow
> transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a
> different branch that
> separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed),
> but I would say
> that the surviving person has the same consciousness  the
> original person
> would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of
> having the
> disease.

That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate 
an uncountable infinity of branches in which a
given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable 
infinity in which he doesn't.


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