Federico Marulli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
I read all your messages and I would like to say something about them. I
think that the concept of "magic universes" considered by Matt King and Hal
Finney and the demonstration that we are not in one of them is improper. If
these magic universes realy existed, I believe that we would have no way to
say if we are in one of them. My reasoning is that we think that our
universe is the most probable one only because we are in it. But other
infinite observers living in other regions of this multiverse would think in
a completly different way believing to be themself privileged observers. How
can we demostrate to be privileged? All our physics may have been found by
chance. Our universe could be the most improbable one and constistency
between the physics of the large and the small could have found by chance
too. For our opinion there is a very small probability for it, but for the
infinite other observers perhaps not.
I am also not agree with Mirai saying
> I think two things are being confused. First, the laws of physics, second,
> the laws of probability. A gas particle follow physical rules (movement,
> bumping, thermal vibrations) and lots of gas particles together follow
> probability rules (low probability of people suffocating in rooms).
The problem is that all the laws of physics have been found observing the
world around us in an experimental way. But all the outcomes of an
experiment are probabilistc and we know the low of physics only with a
certain error. So the paradox in the laws of probability is a paradox in
laws of physics too. The whole physics is probabilistic.
Finally I would like to anser to scerir
> But the above was the case of people living in different ***worlds***
> ***but*** believing in the same QM.
> Now you can imagine what is the problem when they do not even
> believe in the same QM (or QM interpretation!).
> And that, perhaps, is the third-order paradox.
> But maybe thay are not paradoxes. Informations are always
> subjective, more or less.
I'm agree that informations are always subjective, but a physical or
matematical model should not be too. And perhaps the paradox I propose is a
four-order one. The problem in fact is that all the conclusions we could
think are consequence of the hypotesis of applying the physical and
matematical system. But if they were wrong, the conclusions would be wrong,
too. So the simple fact to consider that there could be other observers not
believing in the same QM could be a nonsense.