# Re: Fw: Quantum accident survivor

On Wednesday, November 5, 2003, at 07:56 PM, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:

Hi,

``` ----- Original Message -----
From: "David Kwinter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>```

I mean the absolutely exact same David Kwinter or Eric Cavalcanti as
was the moment before.

I agree that a moment from now there will be a number of exactly
equal copies. Nevertheless, I am sure I will only experience being
one of them, so this is what I mean by ' me ' - the actual experiences
I will have. Maybe some copy of me will win the lottery every time
I play, but that does not give me reason to spend my money on it. I
still believe that the probability that 'I' win is 1/10^6, even if on a
multiverse sense, the probability that at least one copy of me wins is 1.
The same should be the case with death if we assume a materialistic
position.

What do you mean by *entirely equal*?

```----- Original Message -----
From: "David Kwinter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:     >
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 5:19 AM
Subject: Re: Quantum accident survivor```

On Tuesday, November 4, 2003, at 10:47 AM, Eric Cavalcanti wrote:
```Let me stress this point: *I am, for all practical purposes,
one and only one specific configuration of atoms in a
specific universe. I could never say that ' I ' is ALL the
copies, since I NEVER experience what the other copies
experience. The other copies are just similar
configurations of atoms in other universes, which shared
the same history, prior to a given point in time.*
```

```I would consider these other copies entirely equal to myself IF AND
ONLY IF they are succeeding RSSA observer-moments.```

Glossary references : )

```RSSA - The Relative Self-Sampling Assumption, which says that you
should consider your next observer-moment to be randomly sampled
from among all
observer-moments which come immediately after your current
observer-moment
and belong to the same observer.```

In a materialistic framework, ' I ' am a bunch of atoms. These atoms
happen to constitute a system that has self-referential qualities that
we call consciousness. If it happened that these atoms temporarily
(like in a coma or anesthesy) or permanently (death) lose this quality,
so will ' I '.

I respectfully disagree - parallel universes are equally REAL- you will
still be you! Quantum branches stem from the same exact atoms in the
versions of us that die in tons of possible accidents everyday.

I believe that they do in fact exist, and that they do stem from the same
atoms. But they are not 'me', in the sense that I don't see through their
eyes.

I still think that's you, especially if you just died and they lived on.. but now we're just beating a dead horse.

That's what matters when talking about Immortality. We want to
know if WE are immortal - i.e., if our first-person experience is eternal
- not if SOME copy of us will survive.
What QTI assumes is that ' I ' cannot be one of the dead copies - i.e.,
that the dead copies should be excluded from the sampling pool. But
that is a too strong assumption, which I haven't seen any justification for.
Surely my next observer-moment should be alive or it would not be an
observer. But what makes us believe that 'we' - our first-person
individuality - must necessarily have a next observer-moment in the first
place? That is the assumption that does not seem well-based.

```If non-observing states are prohibited, then we should never expect to
be in a coma, or anesthesized, for instance. Whenever you would be
submitted to a surgery, you would see that the doctor somehow failed
to apply the anesthesy correctly, and you would have a *very* conscious
experience.```

-Eric.

I think that in the case of anesthesia or any other unconscious state the true or false outcome of whether we regain consciousness with the passage of time dictates the sampling pool. The collective fates of the parallel copies of me under anesthesia aren't stricken from the sample because we must "necessarily have a next observer-moment" - however this is a concept which I am uncertain about.

```

```