From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney") To: email@example.com Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2005 15:27:25 -0700 (PDT)
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe
> that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the
> thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a significant practical and philosophical difference.
Doubles its measure relative to who? If I am copied while my friend is not, perhaps it makes sense that my measure is doubled relative to his. But what if our entire planet, or entire local region of the universe, was copied? The relative measure of any two people would not be changed, it seems. Perhaps you could say that the measure of observer-moments that take place after the the copying is higher than the measure of observer-moments that take place before it, but I'm not sure that'd be true either, it really depends on what your theory is about how measure should be assigned to different observer-moments. Part of the problem is you seem to be assuming measure can somehow be derived from the number of physical copies in a single universe, whereas I lean more towards the view that a TOE would ultimately be stated simply in terms of observer-moments and the measure on each, with the appearance of a "physical universe" just being a consequence of the particular types of observer-moments that have higher measure. So it seems that it partly depends whether one believes the third-person perspective or the first-person perspective is more fundamental. (Although even if you take the first-person perspective as more basic, you'd need more of a fleshed-out theory of how the appearance of an objective physical universe comes about to say for sure whether copying a mind in a single universe is the same or different from many-worlds splitting.)