Le 19-mai-05, à 14:44, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

Jonathan Colvin wrote:

[quoting Stathis]
>My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the
>duplicated system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I
>"became one" with the new system by direct neural interface. I
>don't have to go to such lengths to learn about the new
>system's mass, volume, behaviour, or any other property, and
>in *this* consists the essential difference between 1st person
>and 3rd person experience. You can minimise it and say it
>doesn't really make much practical difference, but I don't
>think you can deny it.

I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the difference
between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): *an apple*. I don't think
anyone would deny that there is a difference between A and B (even with comp
there is still a difference); but this "essential difference" does not seem
to have anything in particular to do with qualia or experience.


Jonathan Colvin

Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing?


What do you mean by " include" ? Does the artificial brain proposed by your doctor "includes" you ?
In a 1-person sense: yes (assuming c.)
In a 3-person sense: no.
OK?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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