Stathis writes > > > I did not > > > mean that there is no explanation possible for consciousness. > > > It is likely that in the course of time the neuronal > > > mechanisms behind the phenomenon will be worked out and it > > > will be possible to build intelligent, conscious machines. > > > Imagine that advanced aliens have already achieved this > > > through surreptitious study of humans over a number of > > > decades. Their models of human brain function are so good > > > that by running an emulation of one or more humans and their > > > environment they can predict their behaviour better than the > > > humans can themselves.
Well put. An interesting point to add is that since human behavior is almost surely not compressible, the *only* way that they can learn what a human is going to do is to, in effect, run one (the mocked up one in their lab). As you say, they run an *emulation*. But this could mean that they had *no* special insight into consciousness, because by adjusting the teleporter, Scotty can "find out" things too just by making a physical copy of the Captain, and, for example, finding out what he'd say about giving the engineers a raise. But you have described Martian science very well. Here is what I think that they are capable of that *is* important: they could tell (or announce) with very high accuracy whether a species was conscious, and to what extent, in its natural environment, and do all this just from the creature's DNA (and perhaps a little info on the inter- uterine environment). Here is an analogy: in a cold hut in the Scottish highlands in 1440, two bright, but shivering, people are debating the nature of warmth. Says one: "Brrr. Some day the scientists will be so advanced that the can objectively measure hotness, and you and I will more closely agree." And he turned out to be right, as we know now. > > > Now, I think you will agree (although > > > Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this excellent > > > understanding of the processes giving rise to human conscious > > > experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea what > > > the experience is actually like. Yes, but what does that mean? What does it mean for, say, you to know what it's like when I play 1. e4 in a game of chess? I can tell you that it's probably nothing at all like when *you* play 1. e4. But it's strickly a function of how similar our chess careers have been, whether we both have the same opinion of the Alapin counter to the Sicilian, and so forth. So in effect, it really comes down to how much you are already me when you play 1. e4. Somebody here said it much better than I: they said that you have to almost be someone to in order to know what it's like to be them. Jonathan then says > > No, I'd agree that they have no idea what the experience is like. But this > > is no more remarkable than the fact that allthough we may have an excellent > > understanding of photons, we can not travel at the speed of light, or that > > although we may have an excellent understanding of trees, yet we can not > > photosynthesize. Neither of these "problems" seem particularly hard. I totally agree. > We are thus at an impasse, agreeing on all the facts but differing in our > appraisal of the facts. Maybe. But since you (Stathis) write so well, could you summarize what your adversaries seem to be saying and what you say? I'm less sure (than you) that no progress can be made. thanks, Lee