Le 19-août-05, à 22:47, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proof
that a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense about
falsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition?
Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a
machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine
have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism:
machine can behave *like* if they had phenomenal qualia.
To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note
one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis,
you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences
(or subjective, first person, private, etc.).
To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show
that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be
Logically (that is, without OCCAM) we have
comp ==> STRONG AI ==> MEC-BEH
Note that STRONG AI does not entail comp, because "machine could think"
does not entail "only machine could think" (of course if "machine can
think" then with OCCAM, it is reasonable to suppose comp. But given I
propose a proof it is important to keep in mind we cannotI use OCCAM. I
mean I doen't propose any original theory, I take the oldest one and
show it is incompatible with another old prejudice:
So comp is the strongest hypothesis. Now, comp is weaker than any
theory which fixe a level of description. In that sense comp is very
weak. Indeed comp is weaker that quantum mechanics (without collapse),
or any actual theory except Penrose one (despite defect in Penrose
reasoning, the conclusion are similar: comp and materialism are