Hi Stephen, Le 19-août-05, à 22:47, Stephen Paul King a écrit :

It seems to me a proof that YD is false be equivalent to a proofthat a Machine X fails the Turing Test! Is this nonsense aboutfalsifying YD not a requirement that we prove a negative proposition?

`Not at all and it is a key point. You confuse what I call comp, (I am a`

`machine, "Yes doctor", en gros), the strong AI thesis, that is machine`

`have phenomenal qualia (say), and BEH-MEC, behavioral mechanism:`

`machine can behave *like* if they had phenomenal qualia.`

`To be clear: to refute mec-beh you need to prove that ALL machine (note`

`one!) fail the turing test (en gros), to refute the strong AI thesis,`

`you need to prove that ALL machine cannot have phenomenal experiences`

`(or subjective, first person, private, etc.).`

`To refute comp (see the definition in my SANE paper) you need to show`

`that for all level of digital description of yourself, none can be`

`turing emulable.`

Logically (that is, without OCCAM) we have comp ==> STRONG AI ==> MEC-BEH

`Note that STRONG AI does not entail comp, because "machine could think"`

`does not entail "only machine could think" (of course if "machine can`

`think" then with OCCAM, it is reasonable to suppose comp. But given I`

`propose a proof it is important to keep in mind we cannotI use OCCAM. I`

`mean I doen't propose any original theory, I take the oldest one and`

`show it is incompatible with another old prejudice:`

`materialisme/naturalism/physicalism).`

`So comp is the strongest hypothesis. Now, comp is weaker than any`

`theory which fixe a level of description. In that sense comp is very`

`weak. Indeed comp is weaker that quantum mechanics (without collapse),`

`or any actual theory except Penrose one (despite defect in Penrose`

`reasoning, the conclusion are similar: comp and materialism are`

`incompatible.`

Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/