Thanks for your lucid comments. Maybe you are a better advocate
of Bruno's than Bruno himself...
(New Brunswick, NJ)
From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; firstname.lastname@example.org
Sent: Wed, 31 Aug 2005 09:30:07 +1000
Subject: Re: subjective reality
> Than read again! This is from a previous post of Bruno's:
> On 23 Aug 2005, at 16:44, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > [GK]
> > I believe that YD is incompatible with the whole formalism of QM
> > I don't quite think is simply reducible to Unitary Evolution plus
> Collapse, by the way.
> > But if you put it that way, yes, it is the conjunction of both
> does it
> > (and entanglement, of course!)
> >This I knew. The collapse is hardly compatible with comp (and thus
> YD). Even Bohm de Broglie theory, is incompatible with YD.
All I see him saying here is that YD is incompatible with wavefunction
collapse, and also with the Bohm interpretation. His UDA does point to
the necessity of a Everett style Multiverse, which does not have
collapse nor a Bohmian-style preferred branch.
That would be fine if it was really what he is saying! But he insists
"it is not out of the question that he can derive collapse" from the
premises. My point is that you can't have it both ways.
> I am afraid that in Physics, at least, things don't work quite that
> and I think you know that. New TOEs are proposed every other day
> and they are judged on the basis of their assumptions and claims
> before anybody bothers to look for counterexamples. Many of these
> theories are just poorly put together.
That is indeed true. It is cheaper to look for inconsistencies in a
theory that to perform experiments. Also, unbelievable founding
propositions should be eliminated wherever possible.
However, the "claim" (ontological reversal) I take as a sort of
metaphysical principle, ultimately unprovable, but a guide as to how
one thinks about the world. It has the same status as a belief in a
concrete reality, or in Occam's razor. Its utility must be in its
ability to form new scientific theories, rather than in its ability to
predict fact. In my book, I point to a number of specific theoretical
ideas in the theory of consciousness that are implied by ontological
reversal that are currently controversial in cognitive science. The
relationship between self-awareness and consciousness being one of
them. If these specific ideas prove to be of little worth as our
understanding of consciousness improves, then "ontological reversal"
will either be dropped as being of little value, or else appropriately
morphed to yield better theories.
What you are here circumscribing with your careful prose is exactly the
domain of philosophical speculation --- for which I have much regard
try not to confuse with that of scientific prediction. One of the most
intriguing novelties which quantum mechanics has made possible is
the settling of some specific items of speculation by empirical means,
and the creation of what some people call "experimental metaphysics".
That was the case of the Bell-EPR experiments which showed that a
good number of speculative departures from QM (local hidden-variable
theories) are largely inviable. Clearly we do not know what the limits
are to this type of approach but the parts of it that we already have
settled should definitely bind our future speculation.
I have not had a chance to check your book but, from the posts about
it, I confess I am much intrigued about it. When I manage to go thru it
I will try and give you some feed back along the same lines as I have
done with Bruno.
The assumptions of COMP are actually widely supposed to be true, hence
the importance of Bruno's work. He demonstrates that under COMP,
ontological reversal is necessary, and a belief in concrete reality
Curiously, I am in a position where I don't believe COMP to be
strictly true, but is perhaps an approximation of reality. I would be
intrigued in generalization of the COMP argument. However, I find
that the ontological reversal (or perhaps even ontological "cycle"
with the AP) is metaphysically less extravagant than belief on
concrete reality. Furthermore, the approach really does deliver most
of physics as we know it today, as I argue in my book. I am sceptical
that Bruno's approach of reducing knowledge to various modal logic
structures will deliver much of substance, but at very least I can
appreciate that it is a test of the theory.
Now I am confused! So you do not believe Bruno's COMP=YD+CT+AP
but you still believe it is a good enough approximation of reality to
"deliver most of physics as we know it today". Are you saying that,
without assuming COMP you derive all of that physics? I guess I
will have to read your book but a Yes/No answer would help me
decide whether I want to read it at all...
I would rather argue out your assumptions because, as you may
agree, measures of metaphysical extravagance tend to be a bit,
if I may use the word, subjective. I am much more interested in
how one can empirically decide whether a metaphysical thesis
is indeed too extravagant to be true.
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