Bruno, list,

By "ampliative induction" I mean, not mathematical induction.

I also use the term to suggest that I mean inference that is not only 
ampliative (a technical term meaning that the inference adds info in its 
conclusion) but also "retentive" (not a technical term, so far as I know). In 
saying "induction," usually I mean not simple induction (premise about a sample 
group to a conclusion about another individual) or statistical syllogism, etc., 
but instead inference that is both ampliative and retentive (in terms of formal 
implication relations, both non-preservative of truth and preservative of 
falsity), such that all information in the premisses is retained (still of 
interest) in the conclusion and the conclusion contains further information. 
I.e., some kind of generalization to the extent of a distribution, tendency, 
trend, etc. across a larger population or set of items. (I need a more general 
word than "population" since I've also talked (though somewhat vaguely) about 
the use of induction in for the kind of ideas studied by philosophy.)

This is all especially in distinction from "surmise," by which I usually mean 
inference that, in terms of formal implication relations, is neither 
truth-preservative nor falsity-preservative. In other words, if my premiss is 
that the sun has risen every day for a thousand years, and my conclusion is 
that the sun will rise tomorrow, I call that a surmise (to an instance or 
individual) and if my conclusion is that there will never have been a day when 
the sun doesn't rise, I call that a surmise (to a law, though a weak surmise, 
since, among other things, it is not at all luminously explanatory with its 
law; and surmise is of more distinctive interest when, for instance, it is not 
clear which among various patterns should be used as premisses). The dropping 
out of premissed information from the conclusion reflects the focus of 
interest, just as a "strict" or non-reversible deduction drops some info in 
order to highlight other info.

Best, Ben Udell

Le 09-janv.-06, à 17:43, Benjamin Udell a écrit :

> You've outline a whole range of degrees of cognitive assurance from 
> firm to uncertain, and I continue to doubt that it can all be fitted 
> under the notion "faith" or "belief" at all.

Not at all. It was not my goal. More explanation soon.

Ben, before I (try) to anwer your long post, could you explain briefly 
what you mean by "ampliative induction"? Thanks.
I will try to make a synthetical answer to your long post tomorrow or 
the day after.



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