Georges Quenot wrote:
> peterdjones wrote:
> > Georges Quénot wrote:
> >> peterdjones wrote:
> >>> Georges Quénot wrote:
> >>>> peterdjones wrote:
> >> It is just the idea that there could be no difference between
> >> mathematical existence and physical existence.
> > Then why do we use two different words (mathematical and physical) ?
> For various historical and practical reasons and because
> identity is still a conjecture/speculation. Just like we
> used to consider "inertial mass" and "gravitational mass".
So you meant "there might not be any difference",not "there cannot
possibly be any difference".
> it would be a
> "mathematical monism" in which one and only one particulat
> "mathematical object" would exist. This seems logically
> difficult and then: why just this one?
Why only mathematical objects and not any other kind ?
> > We can go some way to explaining the non-existence
> > of HP universes by their requiring a more complex
> > set of laws (where "we" are believers in physical
> > realism).
> Whether HP universes require or not a more complex set
> of laws is a very good question but it seems unlikely
> that it can be easily answered. For some physicists,
> the currently known (or freseeable) set of rules and
> equations for our universe *is* compatible with "HP
Physical MWI is more constrained than mathematical
multiverse theories, so there is not so much Harry-Potterness.
physical MWIs have measure and can at least predict the HP
universes will be rare (or faint, or something).
> Such events might appear in other portions of
> our universe. For others, it is just the opposite, it
> might well be that there do not exist any set of rules
> and equations that would correspond to a "HP universe".
There cannot fail to be. The HP game my nephew
plays on is a mathematical simulation -- what else
could it be?
> > However, we are bound to end up with
> > physical laws being "just so".
> Not really. What is "just so" is that a conscious being
> has to live in only one universe at once just as he has
> to live in only one place and in only one period of time
> at once.
That does not follow form the mathematical
hypothesis. If I am a set, I am a subset of any
number of other sets. If I am a digit-string, I a m a
substring of any number of other substrings.
> It is no more mysterious that I do not live
> Harry Potter's life that I do not live Akenaton's life.
>From the common-sense POV, yes. From the MM POV, no.
> And lots of "HP-like" events have also been reported in
> *this* world.
Nowhere near enough! (compared to what MM predicts).
> >>>> Do you find that "physical monism" ("mind emerges from
> >>> matter activity"),
> >>> All the evidence points to this.
> >> OK. So in your view this makes sense and is likeky to be true.
> > Those are two different claim: it is likely to be true,
> > but seeing *how* it is true, making sense of it is the Hard Problem.
> > IMO the hardest part of the hard problem is seeing how mind
> > emerges from mathematical description -- from physics in the
> > "map" sense, rather than the "territory" sense. Switching to
> > a maths-only metaphysics can only make the Hard Problem harder.
> As I perceive it, this is the hard problem even starting
> with a (classical) physical context. A I perceive it also
> placing it in a mathematical context doesn't make it harder
> or easier. But this is just from my viewpoint indeed.
You didn't say why it doesn't change anything. I think
that having a richer ontology automatically makes it easier
to solve metaphysical problems, since you can say that X , Y or Z
is intrinsic to the universe and therefore not to be "explained away"
as something else. Of course, this manoeuvre should be used sparingly.
An intrinsic theory of heat would have been dead wrong.
> > "Epistemic objectivity of maths" means "every competent mathematician
> > gets the same answer to a given problem". It doesn't say anything about
> > the existence of anything (except possibly mathematicians).
> Well, if "every competent mathematician gets the same answer
> to a given problem", "competent mathematicians" do not have
> much freedom about what they might find as an answer to some
> given problems. So there must "exist" "something" that
> "constrain" them.
Yes: rules, the principle of non-contradiction.
> And "this" might even exist in the absence
> of "competent mathematician".
> > isomorphism is **not** identity!
> This is obviously untrue: it might well be that not all
> isomorphisms are identity
then isomorphism is not identity, since identity
is not mere overlap.
> but, indeed, identity is always
> an isomorphism and, hence, at least *some* isomorphisms
> *can* be the identity.
can be, yes, but more is needed for MM than Tegmark's hypothesis.
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