Our messages becomes longer and longer. I will split my
responses. I will start with this:
> Georges Quenot wrote:
>> Furthermore, most of this HP universe is
>> in the brain of your nephew. What is in the game would be
>> almost nothing without your nephew's imagination to fill
>> the (huge) gaps.
> [ shrugs ] your mathematical multiverse contains every possible
> structure, however detailed,
Maybe not *my* mathematical multiverse.
It seems that many (and actually almost all) "real numbers"
cannot be "reached" by any mathematician, however competent.
A mathematician can specify or designate only a countable
number of real numbers (by formulas) while real numbers are
known to be uncountably infinite. It might be that those
real that can't be reached do not exist "by themselves" as
others would. Similarly, a quite limited (countable) number
of mathematical objects would so exist "by themselves"
while others can't be reached in any way by a mathematician
> so it contains a class of structures resembling the HP game but
> with infinitely more detail.
These could be in in the "non reachable part" and could not
exist for this reason. Especially if an infinite level of
detail is required.
Also you should notice that the view I presented is not in
the context of "Comp". This a view that is different from
both yours and mine (I mean the one I described here).
> You don't seem to be following your own hypothesis through.
I follow in the "reachable" part (I am not sure of what
existence the "rest" can have). We do not know it enough
yet to determine how likely it is to include HP universes
>> >>> However, we are bound to end up with
>> >>> physical laws being "just so".
>> >> Not really. What is "just so" is that a conscious being
>> >> has to live in only one universe at once just as he has
>> >> to live in only one place and in only one period of time
>> >> at once.
>> > That does not follow form the mathematical
>> > hypothesis. If I am a set, I am a subset of any
>> > number of other sets. If I am a digit-string, I a m a
>> > substring of any number of other substrings.
>> This is where we have a different intuition about what
>> mathematical objects can be and what a mathematical object
>> containing (description of) conscious beings might be. For
>> me this is just like you have to live here and now and not
>> in Egypt 3500 years ago.
> That is true on the common-sense basis.
> I don't see any justification for it mathematically ?
I understood that.
>> What "aspect" of a mathematical
>> object I could be is not so clear to me but it is unlikely
>> to be as trivial as a digit string.
> What mathematical object cannot be embedded as an exact duplicate in
> another object ?
I do not perceive myself exactly as "an object embedded in
another object". I do not think I can be abstracted from the
whole "I am part of".
> Do you have anything specific in mind ?
Something like a "quantum wave function" at the scale of the
whole space-time universe.
> actually know ?
I do not see what we can actually *know* in such domains.
I only consider conjectures.
>> >> It is no more mysterious that I do not live
>> >> Harry Potter's life that I do not live Akenaton's life.
>> > From the common-sense POV, yes. From the MM POV, no.
>> Maybe there is more than one MM POV. MM does not really
>> have POV. You and I have POV on what MM can or cannot be.
>> And they do differ.
> it's called "logic".
> Hypotheses have whatever implications they have.
We are using words. These might have different meanings
depending upon who uses them and the context in which one
uses them. Different "logical" implications can also come
out from them.
>> >> And lots of "HP-like" events have also been reported in
>> >> *this* world.
>> > Nowhere near enough! (compared to what MM predicts).
>> MM does not predict.
> Hypotheses have implications.
Fuzzy hypotheses have even more fuzzy implications.
>> You do and I do from our respective
>> interpretations of what MM could or should be (or not).
> It's becoming increasin apparent that your mathematical metaphysics is
> embedded in a subjective relativism.
This is not specific in any way to (what you call) my
"mathematical metaphysics". Subjective relativism is
something what human thinking at large cannot escape from
(and if one thinks it can while I think it cannot, he only
illustrates what I am saying).
> What is wrong with stating
> axioms clearly, and seeing what the consequences are ?
There is no such thing as an unambiguous statement
(in my view of things and in the context, indeed).
I am not sure that we can formulate these questions as
sets of axioms. I am even less sure that we are able
to develop their consequences. We can't even reach a
consensus about what a "mathematical object" could be
or not. Intuitions are difficult to formalize and to
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