Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 01-avr.-06, à 00:46, 1Z a écrit : > > > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > >> And read perhaps the literature on the mind body problem: all > >> materialist approaches has failed, and then the result I got explains > >> what it should be so. > > > > I have my own analysis of the problem: the words "map" and "territory" > > feature. > > > All right but sometime map are continuously or computationally embedded > in the territory, and so there is a fixed point where the point of the > map coincide with the point of the territory: typically yhe indexical > "where you are", both with respect to the territory and its mapped > representation.
That's still isomorphism. What I mean is that there is no problem in the concept that matter can be conscious. The problem is in finding consicousness in 3rd-person descriptions of matter. > The same, somehow, when you say "yes" to the comp doctor. It is not a > model of the functioning of your brain that he will put in your head, > it is, by hypothesis and/or act of faith, a digitally equivalent > substitution. > > > > > > >> Actually you could perhaps explain how do you think a machine is able > >> to distinguish a material (physical) reality from an immaterial > >> (arithmetical) reality. > > > > The same way I can. > > > Perhaps. > Perhaps you can. But I can't take this assertion as a (third person) > argument. Because with comp the old dream metaphysical argument extend > itself on arithmetical truth, so that I suspect you cannot pretend you > can and remain at the same time a sound entity. The dream/solipsism only works if you can account for the realtively constrained nature of perceived reality. > > > > > What can be thought (logical possibility) > > is much broader than what is observed. > > > Indeed. The point is that with comp, what can be observed emerges from > what can be thought. > Not by humans, but by universal machines (or sub-universal one, but > don't want be technic here). Hmmm. Maybe. > > Therefore, there are > > constraints -- matter, laws, etc. > > > Any sound theorem prover machine can already prove that in order to > singularize any observable token related to her, she will need an > infinity of such constraints. I have no idea what you mean by that. I don't regard constraints as being chosen by observers; observers are as subject to the gravity the same as anything else. > Observation can only be partial filtration (by comp). Physical > realities emerge from coherence conditions on machine's dreams overlap; > where dream = "computation" as "seen" from some first-person (plural) > point of view, and then, the emergence is related to the way those > point-of-views glue with each others. Theoretical computer science and > modal logic makes this precise and testable (see my url if you are > interested). > > It seems you believe that the realist modal or other arithmetical > realist inflations of possibilities are unsolvable without invoking a > sort of ad-hoc god, a *physical* universe, As I am forever pointing out, all theories have some ad-hoc element. > but my feeling is that you > underestimated the subtlety of the relation between numbers. The fact > is that there already exist mathematical tools which help to formulate > such problems, and the incompleteness phenomena makes those questions > not so easy. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---