Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 01-avr.-06, Ã 19:18, 1Z a Ã©crit :
> >> All right but sometime map are continuously or computationally
> >> embedded
> >> in the territory, and so there is a fixed point where the point of the
> >> map coincide with the point of the territory: typically yhe indexical
> >> "where you are", both with respect to the territory and its mapped
> >> representation.
> > That's still isomorphism. What I mean is that there is no
> > problem in the concept that matter can be conscious.
> ????? Are you saying the hard problem of *consciousness* is solved ?????
To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
properties as well
as physical properties. The HP is getting the phenomenal properties
"out of" the physical properties, not out of the substrate. Precisely
because a basic concept of matter is basic, it does not exclude other
> ????? Are saying the hard problem of *matter* is solved ?????
> Err... have you references---I mean are you thinking about some precise
> solution, or are you following a common materialist dicto according to
> which there is no problem?
Neither; I am saying that if you regard physical properties as a
a kind of map, the troublesom phenomenal qualities can
be regarded as part of the territory, as part of what make the
from the map.
> > The
> > problem is in finding consicousness in 3rd-person descriptions of
> > matter.
> Indeed. Or to find 3rd-person descriptions of matter in first person
> (hopefully plural) coherent stable bets (the other way round is
> obligatory once you assume comp-like hyp).
if you assume comutationalism (as a I undertand it, not as you
you are already assuming
the existence of matter, since computers are material.
> >>>> Actually you could perhaps explain how do you think a machine is
> >>>> able
> >>>> to distinguish a material (physical) reality from an immaterial
> >>>> (arithmetical) reality.
> >>> The same way I can.
> >> Perhaps.
> >> Perhaps you can. But I can't take this assertion as a (third person)
> >> argument. Because with comp the old dream metaphysical argument extend
> >> itself on arithmetical truth, so that I suspect you cannot pretend you
> >> can and remain at the same time a sound entity.
> > The dream/solipsism only works if you can account for the realtively
> > constrained nature of perceived reality.
> First, please don't confuse solipsism and idealism.
The slide from idealism to solipsis is inevitable. If the existence of
is not needed to explain my experiences, the existence of other
with their own experiences is not neeed to explain my experience
> Second see my work
> for a testable account of perceived reality from numbers and relative
> computational states alone. To be sure the white rabbit problem is not
> yet solved (to be sure it is not really solved in quantum mechanics
> too, even if there some big progress have been made through the
> renormalization theory).
> >> Indeed. The point is that with comp, what can be observed emerges from
> >> what can be thought.
> >> Not by humans, but by universal machines (or sub-universal one, but
> >> don't want be technic here).
> > Hmmm. Maybe.
> >>> Therefore, there are
> >>> constraints -- matter, laws, etc.
> >> Any sound theorem prover machine can already prove that in order to
> >> singularize any observable token related to her, she will need an
> >> infinity of such constraints.
> > I have no idea what you mean by that. I don't regard constraints as
> > being chosen by observers; observers are as subject to the gravity the
> > same as anything else.
> If you believe in absolute QM (or just assume absolute QM I eman QM
> without wave collapse) then, obviously, observers are subject to the
> SWE, and are multiplied or differentiated continuously.
> If you take the assumption of comp, it is easy to justify an apparently
> bigger set of possible differentiation. Then number theoretical
> constraints add many non trivial constraints of what an observer should
> observe, and although gravity is still a quite complex open problem in
> that approach, I don't see any obstacle in the fact that gravity will
> applied on the observers. And if that is the case we will at least
> know why---which is not the case if you postulate gravity from
We can explain graivty in terms of the nature of space and time.
> Obviously I don't take observation nor prediction as explanation. Of
> course observations are necessary to confirm theories and/or deeper
If your original comment meant that extra-mathmatical constraints
> >> Observation can only be partial filtration (by comp). Physical
> >> realities emerge from coherence conditions on machine's dreams
> >> overlap;
> >> where dream = "computation" as "seen" from some first-person (plural)
> >> point of view, and then, the emergence is related to the way those
> >> point-of-views glue with each others. Theoretical computer science and
> >> modal logic makes this precise and testable (see my url if you are
> >> interested).
> >> It seems you believe that the realist modal or other arithmetical
> >> realist inflations of possibilities are unsolvable without invoking a
> >> sort of ad-hoc god, a *physical* universe,
> > As I am forever pointing out, all theories have some ad-hoc element.
> Is that a theorem? Also the "primitive stuffy universe" as an ad hoc
> element seems to be a little gross to me.
It solves the white rabbit problem at a stroke.
> The point is only this: even without occam razor, it is impossible to
> believe in both computationalism *and* in substantialism (the doctrine
> that there exists a non reducible (primitive) stuff.
You mean they are mutually exclusive, not just that matter is an
additional hypothesis ?
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