Le 12-mai-06, à 09:41, Kim Jones a écrit :

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> > Bruno, > > I almost understand this. Just expand a little > > Kim > > On 11/05/2006, at 9:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> Schmidhuber did leave the list by refusing explicitly the first-third >> person distinction (which explain why his great programmer does not >> need to dovetail). > I guess it is a delicate point, a key point though, which overlaps the ASSA/RSSA distinction (that is: the Absolute Self Sampling Assumption versus the Relative Self Sampling Assumption). If you identify a "conscious first person history" with a "third person describable computation", it can be argued that an explanation for physics can be given by Bayesian sort of anthropic reasoning based on some universal probability distribution like Hall Finney's Kolmogorovian UDist. Note tat this approach relies also on Church Thesis. Here somehow the TOE will be a winning little program. I agree that this would hunt away the third person white rabbits. Despite the obvious appeal for such an approach, once we take into account the fact that we cannot know in which computations we belong, and that we are not aware of the delay of a universal dovetailer to rich the computationally accessible computational states, then we realize that we need to take into account the fact that almost all programs which generate us are *big*. Our consciousness is somehow distributed in the whole of the comp-platonia (a non comp structure!). Here somehow the TOE could still be given by a little program, but it needs a justification how it can win an infinite "battle" with the big programs, and eliminate a vaster collection of first person white rabbits. (BTW we are very close to Descartes fifth meditation if you know. His "malin génie" generates first person hallucinations). All this follows from the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument). From empiry it could be that the winning little program describes some quantum universal dovetailer, or an universal unitary transformation, modular functor (topological quantum computer), etc. but all what I try to explain is that such "little program" must be justified as being invariant for some notion of first person (plural) observable taking into account the infinities of infinite computations (once we make explicit the comp (or weaker) assumption. By identifying first and third person experience we need only one successful computation as an explanation. By being aware of the 1-3 distinction we have to dovetail on all computations and (re)defined "reality" as a relative measure on the possible ways of glueing consistent first person experience; if not, I'm afraid the "mind body problem" remains under the rug. Hope that help a little bit. Don't hesitate to ask more explanations. Just be patient if I don't answer so quickly. Some more technical points will be made clearer through the deepening of diagonalization, perhaps. Critics from ASSA people are welcome! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---