Le 12-mai-06, à 09:41, Kim Jones a écrit :

> Bruno,
> I almost understand this. Just expand a little
> Kim
> On 11/05/2006, at 9:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Schmidhuber did leave the list by refusing explicitly the first-third
>> person distinction (which explain why his great programmer does not
>> need to dovetail).

I guess it is a delicate point, a key point though, which overlaps the 
ASSA/RSSA distinction (that is: the Absolute Self Sampling Assumption 
versus the Relative Self Sampling Assumption).

If you identify a "conscious first person history" with a "third person 
describable computation", it can be argued that an explanation for 
physics can be given by Bayesian sort of anthropic reasoning based on 
some  universal  probability distribution like Hall Finney's 
Kolmogorovian UDist. Note tat this approach relies also on Church 
Thesis. Here somehow the TOE will be a winning little program. I agree 
that this would hunt away the third person white rabbits.

Despite the obvious appeal for such an approach, once we take into 
account the fact that we cannot know in which computations we belong, 
and that we are not aware of the delay of a universal dovetailer to 
rich the computationally accessible computational states, then we 
realize that we need to take into account the fact that almost all 
programs which generate us are *big*. Our consciousness is somehow 
distributed in the whole of the comp-platonia (a non comp structure!). 
Here somehow the TOE could still be given by a little program, but it 
needs a justification how it can win an infinite "battle" with the big 
programs, and eliminate a vaster collection of first person white 
rabbits. (BTW we are very close to Descartes fifth meditation if you 
know. His "malin génie" generates first person hallucinations). All 
this follows from the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument).

 From empiry it could be that the winning little program describes some 
quantum universal dovetailer, or an universal unitary transformation, 
modular functor (topological quantum computer), etc. but all what I try 
to explain is that such "little program" must be justified as being 
invariant for some notion of first person (plural) observable taking 
into account the infinities of infinite computations (once we make 
explicit the comp (or weaker) assumption. By identifying first and 
third person experience we need only one successful computation as an 
explanation. By being aware of the 1-3 distinction we have to dovetail 
on all computations and (re)defined "reality" as a relative measure on 
the possible ways of glueing consistent first person experience; if 
not, I'm afraid the "mind body problem" remains under the rug.

Hope that help a little bit. Don't hesitate to ask more explanations. 
Just be patient if I don't answer so quickly.
Some more technical points will be made clearer through the deepening 
of diagonalization, perhaps.

Critics from ASSA people are welcome!



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