Hal Finney wrote: > I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based > on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I am working on > some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from > this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the SSA > rather than the ASSA, i.e. I will work not with observer-moments but > with entire observer lifetimes. But the same principles apply.) > > Let us consider Bruno's example where you are annihilated in Brussels > and then copies of your final state are materialized in Washington and > Moscow, and allowed to continue to run. What can we say about your > subjective first-person expectations in this experiment? > > Here is how I would approach the problem. It is a very straightforward > computational procedure (in principle). Consider any hypothetical > subjective, first person stream of consciousness. This would basically > be a record of the thoughts and experiences of a hypothetical observer. > Let us assume that this can be written and recorded in some form. > Perhaps it is a record of neural firing patterns over the course of the > observer's lifetime, or perhaps a more compressed description based on > such information. > > The question I would aim to answer is this: for any proposed, hypothetical > first-person lifetime stream of consciousness, how much measure does > this hypothetical subjective lifetime acquire from the third-person > events in the universe?
How do you draw the line in a 3rd person view? From the 3rd person view all the events in my body are events in the universe. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---