Hal Finney wrote:
> I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy.  This is based
> on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA.  I am working on
> some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from
> this framework.  (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the SSA
> rather than the ASSA, i.e. I will work not with observer-moments but
> with entire observer lifetimes.  But the same principles apply.)
> Let us consider Bruno's example where you are annihilated in Brussels
> and then copies of your final state are materialized in Washington and
> Moscow, and allowed to continue to run.  What can we say about your
> subjective first-person expectations in this experiment?
> Here is how I would approach the problem.  It is a very straightforward
> computational procedure (in principle).  Consider any hypothetical
> subjective, first person stream of consciousness.  This would basically
> be a record of the thoughts and experiences of a hypothetical observer.
> Let us assume that this can be written and recorded in some form.
> Perhaps it is a record of neural firing patterns over the course of the
> observer's lifetime, or perhaps a more compressed description based on
> such information.
> The question I would aim to answer is this: for any proposed, hypothetical
> first-person lifetime stream of consciousness, how much measure does
> this hypothetical subjective lifetime acquire from the third-person
> events in the universe?

How do you draw the line in a 3rd person view?  From the 3rd person view all 
the events in my body 
are events in the universe.

Brent Meeker

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