Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia.
Bruno Le 22-juin-06, à 00:50, Stephen Paul King a écrit : > > Dear Quentin et al, > > I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm > itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned > for > mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an > implementation > in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of > that can > be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. > > AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any > property, including properties that involve some notion of chance. > First of > all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable > with, an > object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well. > > http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence > > > Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a > predicate > "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the > above web > reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of > relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as > algorithms and > thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If > Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to > follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no > relationship > between entities can obtain. > I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he > deals > with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but > nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain > anything that is even close to a notion of implementation. > > also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ > > Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the > properties that are brought into our thinking on this. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms > "cast > imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary... > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM > Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA > > > > Hi Hal, > > Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit : >> What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the >> implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person >> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no >> way >> in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this >> philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning. >> The MWI doesn't change that. > > That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that > physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, > there > is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be > instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. > > Quentin > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
