What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a
predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate.
Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be
just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia.
Le 22-juin-06, à 00:50, Stephen Paul King a écrit :
> Dear Quentin et al,
> I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm
> itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned
> mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an
> in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of
> that can
> be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have.
> AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any
> property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.
> First of
> all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable
> with, an
> object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well.
> Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a
> "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the
> above web
> reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of
> relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as
> algorithms and
> thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If
> Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to
> follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no
> between entities can obtain.
> I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he
> with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but
> nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain
> anything that is even close to a notion of implementation.
> also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/
> Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the
> properties that are brought into our thinking on this.
> BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms
> imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary...
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <firstname.lastname@example.org>
> Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM
> Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
> Hi Hal,
> Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit :
>> What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the
>> implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person
>> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no
>> in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this
>> philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning.
>> The MWI doesn't change that.
> That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that
> physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision,
> is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be
> instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary.
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