I would like to cut to a couple parts of your reply.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 4:29 AM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
>> Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or
>> His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of
>> Existence in itself.
>> When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all notions
>> of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This is
>> why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism
>> suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if
>> and only
>> if there is some "subject" to which the Forms have a meaning and this
>> "subject" can not be a Form!
> I agree one hundred percent!
> With comp this can already be justified in many ways:
> 1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can
> recognize herself in any third person description done at any level.
This seem to me to accert that no entity has a subset that has a
complete map of the whole within itself *that can be compared to the whole".
Here I am considering the "ability of self-recognize" in terms of the
existence of a self-referencing map.
Somehow it seems that this is trivially obvious but difficult to
> The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form.
Ok, then this implies that Platonia is Incomplete!
> 2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by
Same as 1).
> 3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by
> the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and
> this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person,
> person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come
> back on this when people get some familarization with the
> diagonalization stuff.
I am hoping to comprehend the "diagonalization stuff" some day, my posts
are a part of that attempt...
> Most of those papers are very interesting. By the way, Stephen, I
> realize you are the only one I thank in my last (Elsevier paper) and
> this indeed for having make me read some of Pratt's papers.
> (The others in the list disappears from the paper when, for reason of
> conciseness I drop the "related works" section. Sorry).
> But Pratt, and Girard (and Abramsky) react to the failure of Hilbert
> program by mainly weakening logic, at first. I believe that if a
> mathematical theorem, like Godel's incompleteness, forces us to weaken
> (or enriche) the logic, then an analysis of the incompleteness
> phenomenon should help us to chose the exact way of weakening the
> logic. I would only criticize Girard and Pratt for not providing enough
> motivation. I have still some hope to get an arithmetical *linear
> logic* and extract the relevant "Chu transforms", in the long run. I
> appreciate very much those papers, but in this list the closer I have
> been to that approach is in the combinator posts (prematurely too much
> technical, I would say now.). But see my Elsevier paper for more on
Could you post a link to the Elsevier paper?
>> Bodies are the sets (as point and their interactions = Physics!)
>> Minds are the Boolean algebras (information structures and their
>> implications = Computations!). Is this so hard to swallow?
> I totally agree and swallow this with pleasure :-) (although this is a
> very abstract immaterial view of "bodies")
> More can be said: the quantum appears through parallelizing the boolean
> algebras, and generates the many locally classical bodies. No problem.
I disagree! QM does not follow merely from linear superposition, there
is also (at least) the non-commutativity of observables...
Pratt et al seems to believe that this latter aspect shows up when we
consider the concurrency problem
> Pratt would be more convincing about those mind/body issue if he could
> apply it to the mind/body issues explicitly addressed by the mind/body
> researchers, also, I think.
Pratt is dealing with a deeper aspect of the mind/body problem than most
reseachers consider, with the notable exeption of David Chalmers and Stuart
>> All we are asked to do here is do stop trying to make up a static
> If you talk about the mental or physical Universes, I agree with you.
> Now the "theological universe" from which mind and bodies derive and
> begin to play the many dual and relative games, well, it does not makes
> sense for me to get an outside non static view of it. Dynamics and
> spaces are first person views (assuming comp or weaker).
Have you read about "hypergames"?
How far do you think we can go with the idea of modeling process as
interactive games? I suspect that *any* process has a faithful
representation as a game. BTW, your proof that " The collection of
"everything computable" is not itself computable." seems to be established
by the Hypergame paradox.
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