Dear Bruno,

    I would like to cut to a couple parts of your reply.


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 4:29 AM
Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?


snip
>> [SPK]
>>
>>     Pratt does not seek to reify neither a primary notion of matter or
>> time.
>> His Dualism becomes a Russellerian neutral Monism in the limit of
>> Existence in itself.
>>  When the notion of distinguishability vanishes, so do all notions
>> of Predicates and Properties, all that is left is mere Existence. This is
>> why I am pounding hard on the apparent problem that monistic Platonism
>> suffers from a severe problem, that it is only a coherent theory if
>> and only
>> if there is some "subject" to which the Forms have a meaning and this
>> "subject" can not be a Form!
>
> [BM]
> I agree one hundred percent!
> With comp this can already be justified in many ways:
> 1) The (counter)-intuitive comp level: no 1-soul or first person can
> recognize herself in any third person description done at any level.

[SPK]

    This seem to me to accert that no entity has a subset that has a 
complete map of the whole within itself *that can be compared to the whole". 
Here I am considering the "ability of self-recognize" in terms of the 
existence of a self-referencing map.
    Somehow it seems that this is trivially obvious but difficult to 
comprehend...


> The 1-soul has no description, no name, it is indeed not a Form.

[SPK]

    Ok, then this implies that Platonia is Incomplete!

> 2) The limit of the self-extending self cannot be defined by
> him/her/itself.

[SPK]

    Same as 1).

> 3) When I interview the lobian machine, I define the first person by
> the knower, and I take the Theaetetical definitions of knowledge, and
> this gives thanks, to incompleteness, a non nameable, by any person,
> person. Technical reasons show how 1 2 and 3 are related. We can come
> back on this when people get some familarization with the
> diagonalization stuff.

[SPK]

    I am hoping to comprehend the "diagonalization stuff" some day, my posts 
are a part of that attempt...


snip

>>[SPK]
>> http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#concur02
>>
>> http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech
>>
>> http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#P5
>
> [BM]
> Most of those papers are very interesting. By the way, Stephen, I
> realize you are the only one I thank in my last (Elsevier paper) and
> this indeed for having make me read some of Pratt's papers.
> (The others in the list disappears from the paper when, for reason of
> conciseness I drop the "related works" section. Sorry).
>
> But Pratt, and Girard (and Abramsky) react to the failure of Hilbert
> program by mainly weakening logic, at first. I believe that if a
> mathematical theorem, like Godel's incompleteness, forces us to weaken
> (or enriche) the logic, then an analysis of the incompleteness
> phenomenon should help us to chose the exact way of weakening the
> logic. I would only criticize Girard and Pratt for not providing enough
> motivation. I have still some hope to get an arithmetical *linear
> logic* and extract the relevant "Chu transforms", in the long run. I
> appreciate very much those papers, but in this list the closer I have
> been to that approach is in the combinator posts (prematurely too much
> technical, I would say now.). But see my Elsevier paper for more on
> this.

[SPK]

    Could you post a link to the Elsevier paper?


>>[SPK]
>>     Bodies are the sets (as point and their interactions = Physics!)
>> and
>> Minds are the Boolean algebras (information structures and their
>> implications = Computations!). Is this so hard to swallow?
>
> [BM]
> I totally agree and swallow this with pleasure :-) (although this is a
> very abstract immaterial view of "bodies")
> More can be said: the quantum appears through parallelizing the boolean
> algebras, and generates the many locally classical bodies. No problem.

[SPK]

    I disagree! QM does not follow merely from linear superposition, there 
is also (at least) the non-commutativity of observables...
    Pratt et al seems to believe that this latter aspect shows up when we 
consider the concurrency problem

http://www-i2.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/Forschung/MCS/Mailing_List_archive/con_hyperarchive_1988-1990/0075.html
http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ql
http://www.di.ens.fr/~goubault/link002.html

>[BM]
> Pratt would be more convincing about those mind/body issue if he could
> apply it to the mind/body issues explicitly addressed by the mind/body
> researchers, also, I think.

[SPK]

    Pratt is dealing with a deeper aspect of the mind/body problem than most 
reseachers consider, with the notable exeption of David Chalmers and Stuart 
Hameroff:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/Fundamentality.html


snip

>>[SPK]
>>     All we are asked to do here is do stop trying to make up a static
>> Universe!
>
> [BM]
> If you talk about the mental or physical Universes, I agree with you.
> Now the "theological universe" from which mind and bodies derive and
> begin to play the many dual and relative games, well, it does not makes
> sense for me to get an outside non static view of it. Dynamics and
> spaces are first person views (assuming comp or weaker).


[SPK]

    Have you read about "hypergames"?

http://sigfpe.blogspot.com/2006/03/hyperfun.html
http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~lbrumley/hyper.html
http://www.cs.bilkent.edu.tr/~akman/book-revs/jolli/jolli1997.pdf
http://www.ams.org/bull/1998-35-01/S0273-0979-98-00735-6/S0273-0979-98-00735-6.pdf


    How far do you think we can go with the idea of modeling process as 
interactive games? I suspect that *any* process has a faithful 
representation as a game. BTW, your proof that " The collection of 
"everything computable" is not itself computable." seems to be established 
by the Hypergame paradox.



Onward!

Stephen 

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