Le 02-juil.-06, à 08:44, Tom Caylor a écrit :
> My point is that of the thread title "Only Existence is necessary?"
> Not that observers are necessary for existence, but that existence is
> insufficient for meaning. I'm still holding out for Bruno to work the
> rest of his diagonalization tricks to maybe try to prove otherwise.
OK, and I'm sorry for the interruption. I am also troubled by Norman's
post, I am afraid he loses the track just for reason of notation. The
beauty of recursion theory is that you can arrive quickly, without
prerequisites, to startling fundamental results.
Now, as I said recently, it is really the UD Argument (UDA) which makes
mental and physical existence secondary to arithmetical truth. The diag
stuff just isolates a more constructive path so as to make comp
Somehow I agree with you: existence (being physical, mental, or
numerical) is not enough for meaning, but once we assume comp, meaning,
seen as first person apprehension, is, by definition, related to some
Now the main point is perhaps that although existence is not enough, it
is not necessary either. And that is what really UDA shows, mental and
physical existence are appearances (locally stable for purely number
theoretical reasons) emerging from arithmetical truth.
Comp gives a way to progress without relying on the mystery of first
person quale (which makes meaning meaning), nor on the mystery of
Our qualitative belief in numbers remains a mystery, like the truly
qualitative part of qualia.
Don't expect from the diagonalization posts that I solve *that*
mystery, although it can be argued, assuming comp and self-referential
correctness, that the lobian interview gives the closer third person
explanation of why the first persons cannot escape the percept of many
non communicable mysteries. I would bet consciousness is one of them,
but hardly the only one. That consciousness is a mystery would already
follow if you accept the following weak definition of consciousness.
Consciousness as a qualitative part of an anticipation of (a) reality.
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