Stathis and Bruno:
I am still perlexed (aren't we all?) about the use of
the 1 vs 3. There is no 3rd person 'reality', only the
1st person memory of somebody else communicated to me
when it becomes acknowledged as MY 1st person
interpretation of it. 
I feel we rub too close to the solipsist quagmire of
its unprovable and undeniable lunacy. 

John M
--- Stathis Papaioannou
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Bruno Marchal writes:
>  
> > > It could be, for example, that I have been
> brainwashed and my memories  > > of the past are
> partly or completely false memories. > >   > > There
> is no false 1-memories. Only an association between
> some 1-memory  > and some 3-reality can be false. If
> someone succeeds in implementing  > correctly (more
> than just coherently) false beliefs (like I am
> Napoleon  > just after Waterloo), then I will
> believe correctly that I am Napoleon  > and that I
> have just lose a battle, almost by definition. I
> will have  > to go in an asylum, sure, but my>
> 1-memory of the past is correct given that they have
> been correctly  > implemented.
> This is just what I meant, though my terminology
> seems to differ from yours. As a result, I have a
> belief in a persisting 1st person through time, in
> this example the belief that I was and still am
> Napoleon. Now while I can't be wrong about having
> this memory/belief, I could be wrong in asserting
> that it reflects some 3rd person reality, such as
> that I am over 300 years old. In the same way, I
> think I am wrong in asserting that I believed I was
> Napoleon yesterday, and the day before, and the day
> before that, and so on, which is what a persisting
> 1st person through time is as commonly understood;
> it is true that I *believe* I believed that, but the
> best I could do to verify it would be to examine my
> current memory or other evidence, such as my diary.
> And while my assertion that my present body is over
> 300 years old could be verified in principle by some
> medical test, my assertion that I have continuously
> experienced the mental states of Napoleon during
> this time period runs up against the problem of
> other minds - even when the "other mind" is a past
> version of my own (putative) mind. 
>  
> I'll respond to the rest of your post on the UDA at
> a later time, I need to read it more closely than I
> have time to do today...
>  
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>  
>  
>  
>   > > I agree if you mean by "future" and "past"
> 3-future and 3-past. 1- > > past > > >  > > and
> 1-future is not extrapolation thy are feelings
> continuously lived > > >  > > in a lasting present.
> I can no more doubt of my feeling of past than I > >
> >  > > can doubt of a headache (say). Even if time
> by itself does not exist at > >  > > >  > > all
> (which is the case with comp). The extrapolation
> would reside only > > > in some third person
> projection of that time, space, ... (I think we > >
> > agree, the problem could just be the term
> "illusion").> >> >  I'm not sure if you're saying
> what I was saying above by  > > distinguishing
> between 1-future/past and 3-future/past.> > > I
> think so.> > > >  The relationship between different
> stages in a person's life - how  > > far apart two
> different experiences can be and still belong to the
>  > > same person - is complicated and necessarily
> vague. If we allow that  > > in principle anyone can
> change into anyone else, how can you pin down  > >
> this relationship with any rigour? > > > To
> understand the consequence of UDA, I try to no put
> more rigor than  > needed. Eventually those
> relationship will appear in mathematical form  >
> with the lobian interview. Self-reference through
> diagonalization will  > do the work, but this is
> needed to extract physics from numbers, not to  >
> understand we have to extract physics from numbers
> once we assume comp.> > > > >   > >  >  > > > such
> as believing themselves to be moments in the life of
> a single > > > > individual, having memories or
> quasi-memories in common, and so on.> > >  > > > If
> I split into two that presents no problem for the
> 3rd person POV > > >  > > > (there are two
> instantiations of Stathis extant where before there
> wa > > s > > > > one) nor for the 1st person POV
> (each instantiation knows it is > > > > experiencing
> what it is experiencing as it is experiencing it).>
> > >> > >> > > OK.> > >> > >> > >> > >  > > >  A
> problem does arise when I anticipate the split
> (which one will I > > >  > > > become?) or look back
> at the split (*I* was the original!); there is > > >
> > no correct answer in these cases because it is
> based on 3rd person > > >  > > > extrapolation of
> the 1st person POV, which in addition to its other >
> > >  > > > failings assumes only a single entity can
> be extant at any one time > > > > (only a single 1st
> person exists by definition, but multiple 3rd > > >
> > persons can exist at the one time).> > >> > >> > >
> This is a little weird. You say there is no correct
> answer, and then > > > you give the comp-correct
> answer.> > > The first person is indeed just NOT
> first person-duplicable (unless > > >  > > some
> added artificial telepathic trick, but in general I
> talk only on > > > the usual simple teleportation or
> duplication).> >> >  There is an unambiguous 3rd
> person descriptive answer, but no such  > >
> unambiguous 1st person answer.> > > I think there
> is, once assuming comp.> > > > > We can still talk
> about 1st person expectations, which I agree is the 
> > > important thing for the subject.> > > Yes,
> physics will arise from that.> > > > >   > >  >  > >
> > This is not to say that my mind can or should
> overcome [Lee Corbin > > > > disagrees on the
> "should"] the deeply ingrained belief or illusion >
> > >  > > > that I am a unique, one- > > track
> individual living my life from start to > > > >
> finish,> > >> > >> > >  > > Here you really talk
> about the third person extrapolation, so I agree > >
> >  > > with you. But the first person is not deceive
> by its feeling of living > > >  > > uniquely in time
> and space. It could be dangerous to say so, because
> it > >  > > >  > > leads to (materialism)
> eliminativism which eventually conclude that the > >
>  > > >  > > whole first person thing is an illusion.
> This leads to a deeply wrong > > >  > > sense of
> "human"- > > irresponsibility. Well, it is a
> negation of the first > > > person. I can be sure it
> is wrong, as I bet you can too.> >> >  I would say
> that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion
> in  > > any sense of the word.> > > All right.> > >
> > > It is the very opposite, in a way: the most real
> thing, which cannot  > > be doubted.> > > Yes.> > >
> > But extrapolating to other people or other selves
> in the past, future,  > > coming out of the
> teleporter or whatever, that is another matter.> > >
> True, but then we can assume hypotheses and and we
> can reason, in a  > pure third person way, that is
> doing (refutable and thus doubtable)  > science.  I
> guess this is what we are trying to do right now.> >
> > > > >  > > OK but the fourth step of UDA is just
> asymmetrical duplication without > > > memory loss.>
> > >  > > I don't count the destruction of the
> original+its personal diary as a > > > memory loss,
> giving that the memory is thoroughly conserved in
> the > > > reconstitution (by the hypothesis +
> default assumptions on the > > >  > > rightness of
> the substitution level and the reliability of the
> doctor's > >  > > > work, etc.)> > > What about
> that?> > > Oh.  I see you answer this below ...> >>
> >  What I meant was something like this. You are
> duplicated via  > > destructive teleportation so
> that two copies are produced in separate  > >
> locations. One copy has 40% of its pre-duplication
> memories missing,  > > while the other has 30% of
> its pre-duplication memories missing and  > > 30% of
> a stranger's memories implanted. What is your
> expectation of  > > what is to happen to you as you
> enter the machine?> > > Well, I see that point, but
> this is precisely why I have not allowed  > memory
> loss in the duplication and multiplication
> experiments occuring  > in the UDA. I say yes to the
> doctor provided I have reason to bet that  > the
> copy will be "numerically" identical, at the
> substitution level of  > below.> This is Independent
> of the fact that it is highly probable such amnesy 
> > can help to have an idea of the reason why comp
> histories can fuse, and  > this helps to make
> already comparison between comp and the quantum  >
> (erasure). For your experiment, I wish the candidate
> just say "no" to  > the doctor.> I am not even sure
> it makes sense to talk on 40% of 1-memory, unless  >
> you model the memory by sequence of W and M in
> iterated  > self-duplication, so that in some
> particular simple case,  we can begin  > to analyze,
> but then this is not necessary to get the reversal.>
> > > > > >  I should clarify, what I meant was not
> that I disagree with step 7,  > > but that I find it
> difficult to understand. Going over everything you 
> > > have said in this thread, I think the only thing
> I really disagree  > > with is your insistence that
> we can have 1st person knowledge of our  > > past. I
> don't know that it makes a big difference in the
> final  > > analysis, but I think it is neater,
> simpler and still in keeping with  > > all the facts
> to say that the 1st person is necessarily tied to
> the  > > present.> > > Imagine you are drinking a
> cup of coffee, and just after I implement in  > you
> a 3-false memory of "I have just drink tea".  So
> your incorrigible  > apprehension is that you have
> just drink tea. This is first person  > knowledge
> and it cannot be false, or more precisely it can
> only be  > 1-false and it has to be> 1-true. It can
> be 3-false.> If I insist  that we can have 1st
> person knowledge of the 1-past, it is  > perhaps due
> to the fact that I define (in first approximation)
> the  > "consciousness-present" by a memory of some
> past (like a FINITE  > sequence "W W W M W M W M M M
> W" in 11 repeated duplications: note that  > this
> sequence is a pure first person uncommuncable one,
> the proposition  > "Bruno is this one" admits 2^11
> -1 counterexamples, and the proposition  >
> "Bruno-WWWMWMWMMMW is this one" is (here)
> tautological.> I think I agree with you if you mean
> 3-past by past. But 1-past is just  > the main
> ingredient 
=== message truncated ===


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