Stathis and Bruno: I am still perlexed (aren't we all?) about the use of the 1 vs 3. There is no 3rd person 'reality', only the 1st person memory of somebody else communicated to me when it becomes acknowledged as MY 1st person interpretation of it. I feel we rub too close to the solipsist quagmire of its unprovable and undeniable lunacy.
John M --- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno Marchal writes: > > > > It could be, for example, that I have been > brainwashed and my memories > > of the past are > partly or completely false memories. > > > > There > is no false 1-memories. Only an association between > some 1-memory > and some 3-reality can be false. If > someone succeeds in implementing > correctly (more > than just coherently) false beliefs (like I am > Napoleon > just after Waterloo), then I will > believe correctly that I am Napoleon > and that I > have just lose a battle, almost by definition. I > will have > to go in an asylum, sure, but my> > 1-memory of the past is correct given that they have > been correctly > implemented. > This is just what I meant, though my terminology > seems to differ from yours. As a result, I have a > belief in a persisting 1st person through time, in > this example the belief that I was and still am > Napoleon. Now while I can't be wrong about having > this memory/belief, I could be wrong in asserting > that it reflects some 3rd person reality, such as > that I am over 300 years old. In the same way, I > think I am wrong in asserting that I believed I was > Napoleon yesterday, and the day before, and the day > before that, and so on, which is what a persisting > 1st person through time is as commonly understood; > it is true that I *believe* I believed that, but the > best I could do to verify it would be to examine my > current memory or other evidence, such as my diary. > And while my assertion that my present body is over > 300 years old could be verified in principle by some > medical test, my assertion that I have continuously > experienced the mental states of Napoleon during > this time period runs up against the problem of > other minds - even when the "other mind" is a past > version of my own (putative) mind. > > I'll respond to the rest of your post on the UDA at > a later time, I need to read it more closely than I > have time to do today... > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > I agree if you mean by "future" and "past" > 3-future and 3-past. 1- > > past > > > > > and > 1-future is not extrapolation thy are feelings > continuously lived > > > > > in a lasting present. > I can no more doubt of my feeling of past than I > > > > > > can doubt of a headache (say). Even if time > by itself does not exist at > > > > > > > all > (which is the case with comp). The extrapolation > would reside only > > > in some third person > projection of that time, space, ... (I think we > > > > agree, the problem could just be the term > "illusion").> >> > I'm not sure if you're saying > what I was saying above by > > distinguishing > between 1-future/past and 3-future/past.> > > I > think so.> > > > The relationship between different > stages in a person's life - how > > far apart two > different experiences can be and still belong to the > > > same person - is complicated and necessarily > vague. If we allow that > > in principle anyone can > change into anyone else, how can you pin down > > > this relationship with any rigour? > > > To > understand the consequence of UDA, I try to no put > more rigor than > needed. Eventually those > relationship will appear in mathematical form > > with the lobian interview. Self-reference through > diagonalization will > do the work, but this is > needed to extract physics from numbers, not to > > understand we have to extract physics from numbers > once we assume comp.> > > > > > > > > > > such > as believing themselves to be moments in the life of > a single > > > > individual, having memories or > quasi-memories in common, and so on.> > > > > > If > I split into two that presents no problem for the > 3rd person POV > > > > > > (there are two > instantiations of Stathis extant where before there > wa > > s > > > > one) nor for the 1st person POV > (each instantiation knows it is > > > > experiencing > what it is experiencing as it is experiencing it).> > > >> > >> > > OK.> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > A > problem does arise when I anticipate the split > (which one will I > > > > > > become?) or look back > at the split (*I* was the original!); there is > > > > > no correct answer in these cases because it is > based on 3rd person > > > > > > extrapolation of > the 1st person POV, which in addition to its other > > > > > > > failings assumes only a single entity can > be extant at any one time > > > > (only a single 1st > person exists by definition, but multiple 3rd > > > > > persons can exist at the one time).> > >> > >> > > > This is a little weird. You say there is no correct > answer, and then > > > you give the comp-correct > answer.> > > The first person is indeed just NOT > first person-duplicable (unless > > > > > some > added artificial telepathic trick, but in general I > talk only on > > > the usual simple teleportation or > duplication).> >> > There is an unambiguous 3rd > person descriptive answer, but no such > > > unambiguous 1st person answer.> > > I think there > is, once assuming comp.> > > > > We can still talk > about 1st person expectations, which I agree is the > > > important thing for the subject.> > > Yes, > physics will arise from that.> > > > > > > > > > > > This is not to say that my mind can or should > overcome [Lee Corbin > > > > disagrees on the > "should"] the deeply ingrained belief or illusion > > > > > > > that I am a unique, one- > > track > individual living my life from start to > > > > > finish,> > >> > >> > > > > Here you really talk > about the third person extrapolation, so I agree > > > > > > with you. But the first person is not deceive > by its feeling of living > > > > > uniquely in time > and space. It could be dangerous to say so, because > it > > > > > > > leads to (materialism) > eliminativism which eventually conclude that the > > > > > > > > whole first person thing is an illusion. > This leads to a deeply wrong > > > > > sense of > "human"- > > irresponsibility. Well, it is a > negation of the first > > > person. I can be sure it > is wrong, as I bet you can too.> >> > I would say > that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion > in > > any sense of the word.> > > All right.> > > > > > It is the very opposite, in a way: the most real > thing, which cannot > > be doubted.> > > Yes.> > > > > But extrapolating to other people or other selves > in the past, future, > > coming out of the > teleporter or whatever, that is another matter.> > > > True, but then we can assume hypotheses and and we > can reason, in a > pure third person way, that is > doing (refutable and thus doubtable) > science. I > guess this is what we are trying to do right now.> > > > > > > > > OK but the fourth step of UDA is just > asymmetrical duplication without > > > memory loss.> > > > > > I don't count the destruction of the > original+its personal diary as a > > > memory loss, > giving that the memory is thoroughly conserved in > the > > > reconstitution (by the hypothesis + > default assumptions on the > > > > > rightness of > the substitution level and the reliability of the > doctor's > > > > > work, etc.)> > > What about > that?> > > Oh. I see you answer this below ...> >> > > What I meant was something like this. You are > duplicated via > > destructive teleportation so > that two copies are produced in separate > > > locations. One copy has 40% of its pre-duplication > memories missing, > > while the other has 30% of > its pre-duplication memories missing and > > 30% of > a stranger's memories implanted. What is your > expectation of > > what is to happen to you as you > enter the machine?> > > Well, I see that point, but > this is precisely why I have not allowed > memory > loss in the duplication and multiplication > experiments occuring > in the UDA. I say yes to the > doctor provided I have reason to bet that > the > copy will be "numerically" identical, at the > substitution level of > below.> This is Independent > of the fact that it is highly probable such amnesy > > can help to have an idea of the reason why comp > histories can fuse, and > this helps to make > already comparison between comp and the quantum > > (erasure). For your experiment, I wish the candidate > just say "no" to > the doctor.> I am not even sure > it makes sense to talk on 40% of 1-memory, unless > > you model the memory by sequence of W and M in > iterated > self-duplication, so that in some > particular simple case, we can begin > to analyze, > but then this is not necessary to get the reversal.> > > > > > > I should clarify, what I meant was not > that I disagree with step 7, > > but that I find it > difficult to understand. Going over everything you > > > have said in this thread, I think the only thing > I really disagree > > with is your insistence that > we can have 1st person knowledge of our > > past. I > don't know that it makes a big difference in the > final > > analysis, but I think it is neater, > simpler and still in keeping with > > all the facts > to say that the 1st person is necessarily tied to > the > > present.> > > Imagine you are drinking a > cup of coffee, and just after I implement in > you > a 3-false memory of "I have just drink tea". So > your incorrigible > apprehension is that you have > just drink tea. This is first person > knowledge > and it cannot be false, or more precisely it can > only be > 1-false and it has to be> 1-true. It can > be 3-false.> If I insist that we can have 1st > person knowledge of the 1-past, it is > perhaps due > to the fact that I define (in first approximation) > the > "consciousness-present" by a memory of some > past (like a FINITE > sequence "W W W M W M W M M M > W" in 11 repeated duplications: note that > this > sequence is a pure first person uncommuncable one, > the proposition > "Bruno is this one" admits 2^11 > -1 counterexamples, and the proposition > > "Bruno-WWWMWMWMMMW is this one" is (here) > tautological.> I think I agree with you if you mean > 3-past by past. But 1-past is just > the main > ingredient === message truncated === --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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