Le 06-juil.-06, à 17:02, Bruno Marchal a écrit :

> Le 04-juil.-06, à 23:37, Lee Corbin a écrit :
>> Bruno had written
>>> [Lee wrote]
>>> What do you think of your survival chances if you happen to know
>>> that after you fall asleep tonight, you will be disintegrated,
>>> but the information will be used to create two exact duplicates,
>>> and then one of the duplicates is vaporized and the other
>>> returned to your bed completely unaware?
>>> Zero?  (I.e., you don't survive the "teleportation" aspect at all.)
>>> One-half?  (I.e., your soul goes into one at random, and if that's
>>>             the one that dies, then your number is up.)
>>> One?   (I.e., Stathis will wake up in bed for sure tomorrow, and
>>>         resume his life just as he has done everyday (since our
>>>          fiendish experiments began when he was five years old))
>> and then Bruno said: "Interesting question. I am interested in your
>> own answer. I let Stathis answer (to see if he will give the comp 
>> one).
>> Note that the comp answer here is not needed in the UDA argument where
>> overlapping reconstitution (like in duplications) are never followed 
>> by
>> somethings which looks (at least) like a murder."
>> Well, in the first place, I assume that when a question is asked of
>> anyone on this list, EVERYONE is invited to answer. Certainly when
>> I ask any question, it is for everyone, even if it's true that at
>> the moment I seem more interested in some particular person's answer.
> Me too. Now when threads interferes I ask

... then I realize I could only say tautologies here, and that I didn't 
need to send a post, but apparently my computer takes the initiative to 
send the message. Sorry for that everything-spam.
Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive 
(anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal 
question when thread interferes makes possible to send less mails. But 
I agree here I miss miserably ...

I take the opportunity to ask you Lee what is your expectation in front 
of the running of a Universal
Like with Stathis (and with some other a longer time ago) I feel like 
you understand the six first steps of UDA, including the 1-person 
indeterminacy (which is independent on the identity question as we have 
already agreed sometimes ago); so I am very interested if you get the 
seventh one, that is the reversal (with the extravagant hypothesis that 
there is a physical universe).
(Step eight will eliminate that "extravagant" hypothesis from the 
reasoning, but is not the current main point, if I can say).


PS I take the opportunity to repeat that I do not pretend that Hal 
Finney or even Schmidhuber and others are wrong in their "complexity 
based" approach to the measure problem, just that they does not provide 
explanations how their approaches make the first person white rabbit 
disappearing (but I' sure Kolmogorov complexity could play some key 
role, and I encourage those interested to dig deeper. Wei Dai has 
already mentionned the remarkable book by Li and Vitanyi (Springer 
Verlag 1993). We tackle an hard problem: it is not a luxe to approach 
it in different ways.


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