Bruno and 1Z:
both of you write extraordinary wise remarks in
approx. 3-4 times as many words than I can attentively
However - with mostly agreeing with the positions of
BOTH OF YOU - I may remark (hopefully in less words??)
I consider the epistemic development of our experience
about the world, from precaveman on, so I consider the
figments of earlier explanations reflected in ongoing
(scientific and common sense) thinking. Matter(ly?) is
a primitive view physicists picked up centuries (25+?)
ago and still ride it. I don't know better myself.
Experimental (truth) is gathered by whatever
constructs the appropriate epistemic level allowed for
instrument design and for (sweatty) explanations on
Math contributed always to the misunderstganding by
equating the primitively cut model-views into soothing
matchings: to satisfy the 'savants'. As long as we do
abide by the past misunderstandings (and I mean
EVERYTHING gotten from past wisdom) and do not regard
them just as hints for a better thinking, we go in
circles. Example the multiverse as a replications of
this one we observe (as we can). I had no echo on 'my'
multiverse: universes in "all possible" qualia and
"all possible systems (some of them - maybe - CAPABLE
OF CONTACTING US. That reaches into sci-fi, into the
'zookeeper' theory, even a rational foundation for
many religious miracles and their systemic
explanations. E.g. teleportation marvels and Q-suicide
1Z mentions 'mentality of matter' - of course, if we
consider the m-word as ideational functioning, any
following of 'rules' in the coexistence(?) simplified
in our physics (and logical) reductionism as 'laws'.
Matter is more difficult, we 'grew' into percepts over
milennia to assign response to impact as 'hard',
'pain', 'warm', whatever.
The "all possible" is a hard phrase, WE are not to
tell what is (=we find) possible or not. Matter,
particles are not possible, they are explanations for
our age- long ignorance and so leveled explanations,
which went as inherited memes into our basic 'mental'
and gives foundation to the ways we think.
I cannot elaborate on these features, cannot defend
them in an argument, cannot even 'think' in them: I am
(I hope) a human being with all the imperfections.
And I may be wrong, just as any other thinking person.
--- 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 12-juil.-06, � 18:06, 1Z a �crit :
> > >
> > > I mean that is what material exists regardless
> of any mathematical
> > > justification.
> > So this is your main hypothesis: what is material
> > Now my problem is that a term like "material" is
> very vague in physics,
> Huh ? Physics studies matter, energy, time and
> space. Those
> are its topics. Physics may not have a single neat
> definition of
> matter, but
> that does not mean physicsts are a lot to know what
> it is.
> Arguably, the whole of economics is a definition of
> Likewise for physics and matter.
> > and I would say experimentally vague since the
> birth of experimental
> > quantum philosophy (EPR, Bell, Shimoni, Feynman,
> Deutsch, Bennett ...).
> Huh???? Electrons and photons are still
> matter...what *do* you mean ?
> (BTW, Deutsch uses the Johnsonian "if it kicks back"
> to reality).
> > The big problem with the notion of *primary*
> matter = how to relate
> > "1-experiences" with "3-experiments".
> The mind-body prolbem boild down to qualia, and
> the problem of qualia and physics boils down to
> the problem of qualia and mathematical description
> Consciousness is a problem for all forms of
> materialism and physicalism
> to some
> extent, but it is possible to discern where the
> problem is particularly
> There is no great problem with the idea that matter
> considered as a
> bare substrate can
> have mental properities. Any inability to have
> mental proeprties would
> itslef be a property and
> therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a
> bare substrate. The
> "subjectity" of
> consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils
> down to a problem
> of communicating
> one's qualia -- how one feesl, how things seem. Thus
> it is not truly
> inherent but
> depends on the means of communication being used.
> Feelings and seemings
> can be more readily
> communicated in artistic, poetice language, and
> least readily in
> scientifi technical
> language. Since the harder, more technical a science
> is, the more
> mathematical it is,
> the communication problem is at its most acute in a
> purely mathematical
> Thus the problem with physicalism is not its posit
> of matter (as a bare
> but its other posit, that all properties are
> phycial. Since physics is
> that amounts to the claim that all properties are
> mathematical (or at
> least mathematically
> describable). In making the transition from a
> physicalist world-view to
> a mathematical
> one, the concept of a material substrate is
> abandoned (although it was
> never a problem
> for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical
> properties becomes,
> which is a problem
> for consciousness becomes extreme.
> > The na�ve idea of attaching consciousness to
> physical activity leads to
> > fatal difficulties.
> Do you mean the Maudlin/Olympia/Movie argument ? But
> that is
> very much phsyical activity as opposed to physical
> If you are the kind of physicalist who thinks
> counterfactuals and potentials are part of the total
> physical situation, the Maudlin argument has little
> > >> Well, why not, if that is your definition. I
> understand better why you
> > >> say you could introduce "matter" in Platonia.
> Plato would have
> > >> disagree
> > >> in the sense that "matter" is the shadow of the
> ideal intelligible
> > >> reality.
> > >
> > > What is material exists. Whether Platonia exists
> > > is another matter. It is for Platonism to
> justify itslef
> > > in terms of the concrete reality we find
> oursleves in,
> > > not for concrete reality to be justify itself in
> > > of Platonia.
> > It depends of the assumptions you start from.
> Of course. I start from the assumption
> that I exist, since I do.
> I don't start from the assumtion that numbers
> exist supernaturally , floating around in Plato's
> > > The "intelligible" is a quasi-empiricist
> mathematical epistemology.
> > > Mathematicians are supposed by Platonists to be
> able to "perceive"
> > > mathematical
> > > truth with some extra organ.
> > That is na�ve platonism. Already condemned by
> Plato himself and most of
> > his followers. Read Plotinus for more on this
> (especially Ennead V).
> The question then is whether numbers have any role
> at all,
> if they have no epistemological role.
> > >> I don't understand what you mean by "numbers
> don't exist at all".
> > >
> > > Well, I've never seen one.
> > Again that would be a critics of na�ve
> As I have said:
> > "number n exists in Platonia" means just that the
> proposition "number n
> > exists" is true. For example I believe that the
> > x^2 - 61y^2 = 1 admits integers solutions
> independently of any things
> > related to me.
> If that is all it means, it cannot possibly support
> an argument
> whose conclusion is that something really exists.
> The conclusion of a deductive argument has to be
> implicit in its
> > >> Numbers exists in Platonia in the sense that
> the classical proposition
> > >> "4356667654090987890111 is prime or
> 4356667654090987890111 is not
> > >> prime" is true there.
> > >
> > > It's true here. why bring Platonia into it ?
> > I don't understand what you mean by
> "4356667654090987890111 is prime or
> > not" is true here.
> > Is it false or meaningless on the moon?
> > is it false or meaningless beyond the solar
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