Jesse Mazer wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > >Jesse Mazer wrote: > > > > > > > >Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing > > > >emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an > > > >explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working > > > >hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically non computationalist. > > > > > > Why would Chalmers' version of dualism be non-computationalist? > > > >That would depend on whether you are dealing with > >consciousness-is-computation computationalism > >or cognition-is-computation computationalism. > > Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends on > what your definition of "is" is...if you understand it to mean that a > conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing a > certain computation, I suppose Chalmers would not be a "computationalist" in > this sense, but if you just understand it to mean that the experience and > the computation are inextricably linked then he still could be called a > computationalist.
He goes to great lengths to explain the difference between supervenience and identity. > > > As I > > > understand him, he does argue that there is a one-to-one relationship > > > between computations and conscious experiences, > > > >But not an identity relationship. > > But what if the one-to-one relationship is not understood to be contingent, > i.e. the relationship between first-person qualia and third-person > descriptions of computations is the same in all possible worlds? That's supervenience under logical or natural laws. > > > and he certainly believes > > > that a sufficiently detailed simulation of a brain would *behave* just > >like > > > the original. > > > >But that is underpinned by psychophysical laws, not identity. > > If the psychophysical laws are a matter of necessary truth, I'm not sure > this is a meaningful distinction...as an analogy, "1+1" being equal to "2" > could be said to be underpinned by the laws of arithmetic, but if these laws > are necessary ones, then isn't "1+1" also identical with "2"? If you can't even express qualia mathemtically how can you have a mathemtically necessary psychophysical law ? --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
