John M wrote:
> Brent,
> there is wisdom in your views - b u t -...
> Does anybody really 'know'- 'experience'-and indeed:  ' feel' what and how 
> another person idenfifies internally feeling the color red?

I think 'know' and 'experience' are different.  We all think that we know how 
another person feels 
when they hit their thumb with a hammer - because we've done that and we 
remember how it feels.  But 
instead of seeing the other person hit their thumb and hearing their reaction, 
suppose we observed 
all their brain and other neural and hormonal processes at the time and suppose 
we knew enough about 
human brains that we could make one.  I'm suggesting that we could know how the 
person felt about 
hitting his thumb just from that "internal" observation.  And then, carrying 
that a step further, we 
could infer how chimpanzees feel from their neural processes, and dogs, and 
mice, and...

> All physical-physiological data can be  fixed, yet it is open whether 
> another person feels 'red' as I do 'green. (Long standing debate os psych 
> lists).

But is it really in doubt, or is it just a philosophical game.  Knowledge is 
usually taken to mean 
true belief that is justified: not certain.

> Then again we forget the big mystery: the (feeling of) SELF, and I mean it 
> in a wider sense, not only human. I try to identify it (am not satisfied) 
> with the broader effect of an intereffecting relational group on its 
> wide-range environmental impacts. The 'self' does not end at the skin (I say 
> that metaphorically), but depends on the 'within-skin' processes of 
> interrelated and self-reflected relations in the 'beyond skin' relations.
> Now these are just as individual,as DNA or fingerprint (just 2 silly 
> examples) and so is the interrelation with the beyond-skin world. No two 
> 'self-s' relate identically.

1) How do you know this?  and 2) how about "similarly"?  Sure DNAs are unique 
and so are 
fingerprints - but that doesn't mean we can't understand how another person's 
fingers work.

Brent Meeker

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