Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>> No bigger than the "assumption" that "other" minds exists (a key >> assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor). > > Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds > and that we cannot possibly > know what their experiences are like? Not with comp. Other minds have personal experiences, and if they are vehiculated by a software having a complexity comparable to your's, those personal experience are knowable only by empathy, for you. Not 3-describable knowledge. >> And then it is a theorem that for any correct machine there are true >> propositions about them that the machine cannot prove. > > And there are true propositions about itself that the machine cannot > prove - but are they > "experiences"? Certainly there are myriad true propositions about > what my brain is doing that I am > not, and cannot be aware of, but they aren't experiences. I don't try to use a sophisticated theory of knowledge. You mention yourself "knowing" can be given by true justified opinion (Theaetetus). I take "provability of p" as a form of justified opinion of p: Bp. Then I get knowledge by adding that p is true, under the form "& p". Limiting ourself to correct machine, we know that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent, but the key (godelian) point is that the machine itself cannot know that for its own provability predicate, making the logic of Bp & p different. It can be proved that Bp & p acts as a knowledge operator(*) (S4 modal logic), even a "temporal one" (S4Grz logic), and even a quasi quantum one with comp: S4GRz1 proves LASE p -> BDp necessary to get an arithmetical interpretation of some quantum logic. So "non provability" is not the way I "model" experience in the lobian interview. I model experiences and experiments with *variant* of G and G*, the logics of provable and true provability respectively. The variants are obtain by adding "& p" or "& Dp". This could sound technical, it is, sorry. Bruno (*) Which I should have recall to Russell (it is the best justification for the "& p"). Artemov has shown that it is the only one possible(*) if we decide to restrict ourself (as I have done) to what Russell call "mathematical knowledge", but if Russell agrees with the UDA, this should not cause a problem (especially knowing that S4Grz describes mathematically a form of knowledge which cannot be put (knowingly) in a mathematical form. That's admittedly counter-intuitive and subtle and explains why I need to get people familiar with many similar counter-intuitive propositions which all are obtained directly or indirectly from diagonalizations. (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/ 6%20La%20these%20d'Artemov.pdf http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
