Russell Standish wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Russell Standish writes:
> >
> > > To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our> observed 
> > > reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other> brains, for which 
> > > we must assume supervenience of other persons (the> no zombies 
> > > assumption).> > What is the cause of this supervenience? It is a symptom 
> > > of the> anthropic principle (observed reality being consistent with our> 
> > > brains), but this is merely transferring the mystery. In my ToN book I> 
> > > advance the argument that this has to be something to do with> 
> > > self-awareness - ie the body is necessary for self-awareness, and> 
> > > self-awareness must therefore be necessary for consciousness.> > Bruno, I 
> > > know in your theory that introspection is a vital component> (the 
> > > Goedel-like constructions), but I didn't see how this turns back> onto 
> > > the self-awareness issue. Did you develop this side of the argument?
> > Why is the body necessary for self-awareness?
> >And why are our heads not homogeneously solid like a potato?
> Good question!
> > The
> >answer is straightforward if you say only computers compute, but not
> >if you say everything computes, or every computation is implemented
> >(sans "physical reality") by virtue of its status as a mathematical
> >object in Platonia.
> But why does our consciousness supervene on any physical object (which we
> conventionally label "heads")?

it is easy enough to see why the Easy Problem asepcts of

# the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to
environmental stimuli;
# the integration of information by a cognitive system;
# the reportability of mental states;
# the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
# the focus of attention;
# the deliberate control of behavior;
# the difference between wakefulness and sleep. The question, then, is : why do the Hard Problem aspects..

(The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience.
When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing,
but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it,
there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This
subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we
experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the
experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field.
Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the
sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily
sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up
internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream
of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is
something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of

...supervene on the easy problem aspects. Of course, the universe would
be quite
a strange place if reports of red qualia (EP) weren't accompanied by
red qualia (HP)!

Which is just he issue Chalmers addresses in another key paper:

"Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia"

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