Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot
> > > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist.
> > >
> > > It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene
> > > on the physical.
> >
> > I don't see how that is connected,
> If you can conceptualise of a virtual reality generated by a computation
> or a mind, and that computation or mind does not require physical
> hardware on which to run, then it is possible (Bruno argues, necessary)
> that our reality is a virtual reality without any underlying "real" world.

A "virtual reality" that is being "generated" is an existing (in some
virtual reality that is being really (in some sense)

A computation that does not require
physical hardware is either non-existent simpliciter
(in which case we are simply not such a computation, since nothing
existing is identical to anythig non-existing) or it exists
(non-physically, in some sense),

A valid argument cannot, in genral, come to a conlusion
that is not already implcit in its premises.

Either existence is implict in the "virtual reality" premiss, or it
isn't. If it is, a Platonic quesiton is being begged. If it isn't,
the existential conclusion is invalid.

> > and I don't want to claim that the mental
> > does not supervene on the physical.
> I didn't think you would.
> > > This is far from a generally accepted fact,
> > > but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments
> > > against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience
> > > theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism.
> >
> > Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism.
> Maybe, but mind would be something very mysterious if it isn't computation,

Most things aren't computation. Most things also aren't mysterious.

> and mysteriouness goes against the grain for physicalists.

> > Maudlin's arguments rest on the  idea that physicalists must ignore
> > counterfactuals.
> > That assumption can  easilly be abandoned.
> I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,

I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
if-then statements.

> other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing
> any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case,
> Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to
> a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is
> conscious and the other not.

If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically

> If anyone should find such an idea unpalatable
> it should be the physicalists.

So I am told, but I remain unconvinced.

> Stathis Papaioannou
> _________________________________________________________________
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