Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot > > > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. > > > > > > It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene > > > on the physical. > > > > I don't see how that is connected, > > If you can conceptualise of a virtual reality generated by a computation > or a mind, and that computation or mind does not require physical > hardware on which to run, then it is possible (Bruno argues, necessary) > that our reality is a virtual reality without any underlying "real" world.
A "virtual reality" that is being "generated" is an existing (in some sense) virtual reality that is being really (in some sense) generated. A computation that does not require physical hardware is either non-existent simpliciter (in which case we are simply not such a computation, since nothing existing is identical to anythig non-existing) or it exists Platonically (non-physically, in some sense), A valid argument cannot, in genral, come to a conlusion that is not already implcit in its premises. Either existence is implict in the "virtual reality" premiss, or it isn't. If it is, a Platonic quesiton is being begged. If it isn't, the existential conclusion is invalid. > > and I don't want to claim that the mental > > does not supervene on the physical. > > I didn't think you would. > > > > This is far from a generally accepted fact, > > > but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments > > > against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience > > > theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. > > > > Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. > > Maybe, but mind would be something very mysterious if it isn't computation, Most things aren't computation. Most things also aren't mysterious. > and mysteriouness goes against the grain for physicalists. > > Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore > > counterfactuals. > > That assumption can easilly be abandoned. > > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. > other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing > any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, > Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to > a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is > conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. > If anyone should find such an idea unpalatable > it should be the physicalists. So I am told, but I remain unconvinced. > Stathis Papaioannou > > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---