Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes: > > [quoting Russell Standish] > > > > The Game of Life is known to be Turing complete. However, I do not > > > > think any arrangement of dots in GoL could be conscious. Rather there > > > > is an arrangement that implements a universal dovetailer. The UD is > > > > quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of > > > > where > > > > Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious > > > > processes. > > [quoting SP] > > > That's putting it inversely compared to my (naive) understanding of how > > > the UD works. > > > I would have said > > > (a) some programs are associated with consciousness > > > (b) the UD emulates all programs > > > (c) hence, the UD emulates all the conscious programs > > > > > > In particular, I would have said that some sequence of frames in GoL is > > > associated with > > > a particular consciousness that can interact with the universe providing > > > the substrate of > > > its implementation, because we can observe the patterns, maybe even link > > > them to real > > > world events. > > > > That is a strange passage. Are you saying that the links would > > be > > a) causal > > b) coincidental > > c) there is no difference between a) and b). > > The links would be causal in the normal sense of the word, i.e. the computer > running GoL is an > electronic device following the laws of physics, and we could link its output > to real world events > in the usual way that we interface with electronic computers. But the GoL is fairy self-contained. Only the starting sate could be supplied as an input. But if it supposed to be emulating a UD, that fixes the starting state, and if the UD is supposed to be gnerating a multiverse, what need does it have of external inputs ? > > > This does not necessarily mean that the consciousness is caused by or > > > supervenes on the pattern of dots, any more that the number 3 is caused > > > by or supervenes > > > on a collection of 3 objects. If anything, it could be the other way > > > around: the GoL pattern > > > supervenes on, or is isomorphic with, the consciousness which resides in > > > Platonia. > > > > > > ???? > > Well, this is the whole problem we have been discussing these past few weeks. > The computer > exhibits intelligent behaviour and we conclude that it is probably conscious. > The physical > states of the computer are clearly the cause of its behaviour, and the means > whereby we > can observe it or interact with it, but is it correct to say that the > physical states are the cause > of its *consciousness*? If physicalism is correct, only physical states exist, so yes. > At first glance, the answer is "yes". But what about a computer which > goes through exactly the same physical states as part of a recording, as > discussed in my other > posts? It won't be exactly the same state, since dispositions and counterfactuals have a physical basis. >If you say this is not conscious, you have a problem, because identical >electrical activity > in the computer's circuitry would then on one occasion cause consciousness > and on another > occasion not. It all depends on what you mean by "activity". The total physical state will be different. > If you say it is conscious, then you have to allow that a recording or an > inputless > machine can be conscious, something many computationalists are loathe to do. That depends whether they are consciousness-computationalists or cognition-computationalists. > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
