Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with >>>consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also >>>be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how >>>exactly the association occurs. For example, suppose I have a conversation >>>with a putatively conscious computer program as part of a Turing test, and >>>the program passes, convincing me and everyone else that it has been >>>conscious during the test. Then, I start up the program again with no memory >>>saved from the first run, but this time I play it a recording of my voice >>>from >>>the first test. The program will go through exactly the same resposes as >>>during the first run, but this time to an external observer who saw the >>>first >>>run the program's responses will be no more surprising that my questions >>>on the recording of my voice. The program itself won't know what's coming >>>and it might even think it is being clever by throwing is some >>>"unpredictable" >>>answers to prove how free and human-like it really is. I don't think there >>>is any >>>basis for saying it is conscious during the first run but not during the >>>second. I >>>also don't think it helps to say that its responses *would* have been >>>different >>>even on the second run had its input been different, because that is true of >>>any record player or automaton. >> >>I think it does help; or at least it makes a difference. I think you >>illegitmately >>move the boundary between the thing supposed to be conscious (I'd prefer >>"intelligent", because I think intelligence requires counterfactuals, but I'm >>not >>sure about consciousness) and its environment in drawing that conclusion. >>The >>question is whether the *recording* is conscious. It has no input. But then >>you say >>it has counterfactuals because the output of a *record player* would be >>different >>with a different input. One might well say that a record player has >>intelligence - >>of a very low level. But a record does not. > > > Perhaps there is a difference between intelligence and consciousness. > Intelligence > must be defined operationally, as you have suggested, which involves the > intelligent > agent interacting with the environment. A computer hardwired with "input" is > not a > very useful device from the point of view of an observer, displaying no more > intelligence > than a film of the screen would. However, useless though it might be, I don't > see why > the computer should not be conscious with the hardwired input if it is > conscious with the > same input on a particular run from a variable environment. If the experiment > were set > up properly, it would be impossible for the computer to know where the input > was > coming from. Another way to look at it would be to say that intelligence is > relative to > an environment but consciousness is absolute. This is in keeping with the > fact that > intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. > > Stathis Papaioannou
Good point. I think I agree. My functional view of consciousness is that it's a filter that puts together a story about what's important to remember. It's needed for learning and hence for intelligence of higher order - but it's a subsystem of intelligence in general. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
