David Nyman wrote:
> Why talk of zombies? A zombie is a being that is supposedly conceivable > (though not to me) as being 'unconscious' despite apparently possessing > the structural/ behavioural prerequisites of consciousness. I was > referring to the issue that, if the characteristics of consciousness > are indeed correlated with specific physical activities, then aspects > of consciousness would necessarily *co-vary* with physical > instantiation. To avoid this, comp would need to adopt a substitution > level that preserved the invariance of whatever 'physical activities' > were deemed relevant to consciousness (as I suggest above). Computationalism deems that no pphsycial activity is essential to consicousnes (except insofar as it is essential to computation). However, "comp" may not be the same as computationalism. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
