Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Colin Hales writes: > > >>Please consider the plight of the zombie scientist with a huge set of >>sensory feeds and similar set of effectors. All carry similar signal >>encoding and all, in themselves, bestow no experiential qualities on the >>zombie. >> >>Add a capacity to detect regularity in the sensory feeds. >>Add a scientific goal-seeking behaviour. >> >>Note that this zombie... >>a) has the internal life of a dreamless sleep >>b) has no concept or percept of body or periphery >>c) has no concept that it is embedded in a universe. >> >>I put it to you that science (the extraction of regularity) is the science >>of zombie sensory fields, not the science of the natural world outside the >>zombie scientist. No amount of creativity (except maybe random choices) >>would ever lead to any abstraction of the outside world that gave it the >>ability to handle novelty in the natural world outside the zombie scientist. >> >>No matter how sophisticated the sensory feeds and any guesswork as to a >>model (abstraction) of the universe, the zombie would eventually find >>novelty invisible because the sensory feeds fail to depict the novelty .ie. >>same sensory feeds for different behaviour of the natural world. >> >>Technology built by a zombie scientist would replicate zombie sensory feeds, >>not deliver an independently operating novel chunk of hardware with a >>defined function(if the idea of function even has meaning in this instance). >> >>The purpose of consciousness is, IMO, to endow the cognitive agent with at >>least a repeatable (not accurate!) simile of the universe outside the >>cognitive agent so that novelty can be handled. Only then can the zombie >>scientist detect arbitrary levels of novelty and do open ended science (or >>survive in the wild world of novel environmental circumstance). >> >>In the absence of the functionality of phenomenal consciousness and with >>finite sensory feeds you cannot construct any world-model (abstraction) in >>the form of an innate (a-priori) belief system that will deliver an endless >>ability to discriminate novelty. In a very Godellian way eventually a limit >>would be reach where the abstracted model could not make any prediction that >>can be detected. The zombie is, in a very real way, faced with 'truths' that >>exist but can't be accessed/perceived. As such its behaviour will be >>fundamentally fragile in the face of novelty (just like all computer >>programs are). >>----------------------------------- >>Just to make the zombie a little more real... consider the industrial >>control system computer. I have designed, installed hundreds and wired up >>tens (hundreds?) of thousands of sensors and an unthinkable number of >>kilometers of cables. (NEVER again!) In all cases I put it to you that the >>phenomenal content of sensory connections may, at best, be characterised as >>whatever it is like to have electrons crash through wires, for that is what >>is actually going on. As far as the internal life of the CPU is concerned... >>whatever it is like to be an electrically noisy hot rock, regardless of the >>program....although the character of the noise may alter with different >>programs! >> >>I am a zombie expert! No that didn't come out right...erm.... >>perhaps... "I think I might be a world expert in zombies".... yes, that's >>better. >>:-) >>Colin Hales > > > I've had another think about this after reading the paper you sent me. It > seems that > you are making two separate claims. The first is that a zombie would not be > able to > behave like a conscious being in every situation: specifically, when called > upon to be > scientifically creative. If this is correct it would be a corollary of the > Turing test, i.e., > if it behaves as if it is conscious under every situation, then it's > conscious. However, > you are being quite specific in describing what types of behaviour could only > occur > in the setting of phenomenal consciousness. Could you perhaps be even more > specific > and give an example of the simplest possible behaviour or scientific theory > which an > unconscious machine would be unable to mimic? > > The second claim is that a computer could only ever be a zombie, and > therefore could > never be scientifically creative. However, it is possible to agree with the > first claim and > reject this one. Perhaps if a computer were complex enough to truly mimic the > behaviour > of a conscious being, including being scientifically creative, then it would > indeed be > conscious. Perhaps our present computers are either unconscious because they > are too > primitive or they are indeed conscious, but at the very low end of a > consciousness > continuum, like single-celled organisms or organisms with relatively simple > nervous systems > like planaria. > > Stathis Papaioannou
I even know some spirit dualist who allow that spirit might attach to sufficiently complex computers and hence make them conscious or ensoul them. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
