Le 16-sept.-06, à 23:37, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :

Bruno wrote
Colin Geoffrey Hales a ��it :
5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by
asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper
science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside
world.
And you *know* that?

We can *bet* on a independent reality, that's all. Justifiably so
assuming comp, but I think you don't.
Self-referentially correct machine can *only* bet on their
self-referential and referential correctness.


Bruno

I don't assume COMP. The idea that this is necessary to hold a position on
anything is, for me, simply irrelevant and preumptuous that COMP is able
to make any useful predictions.


My point is that COMP is a so big assumption that it does make verifiable predictions.




COMP is not an empirically supportable
position, no matter how elegant it may look.

But is there any empirically reason to disbelieve in it?
Fromthe UDA you can show that to make comp false you need to introduce actual infinities in the subject.
I know only Penrose for having try to do that, unsuccessfully.




I would consider it so if it
could predict the existence and properties of brain material.

But that is exactly my modest (UDA) point. Comp has to predict the (apparent) existence of the brain, atoms ...
I show why.
Then I show how and got results in the arithmetical UDA (or lobian interview).



Having said that ....yes you are right that 'betting' on an independent
reality is all we can do....this is an empirical matter.

All right. Note that if you believe in primitive physicality, you are quite coherent by abandoning comp.



Whatever it is
that enables vast legions of scientists to do their job (deines their
job), relentlessly for hundreds of years....that mutually eqisitely
produced, shared delusion called the natural world.... that thing... that
we appear to be within and constantly demonstrate it via creation of novel
technology that seems to operate within it.... That is worth betting
on...the process of consideration that it may not be there is of no
practical value.

I do agree with you, but let us not confuse the two following bets:
a) Betting on an independent reality (like I do)
b) Betting on a material primitive world (like I do not).

I have always feel myself as a REALIST scientist. But then I argue that if comp is true, then physical stuff emerge from a deeper non material reality, like for example (assuming comp) the relation between numbers.

Perhaps even Stephen Hawking points in that direction with his beautiful selected basic papers: "God created the Integers".


But I'm not sure you have really 'got' what I mean by 'it does not know
there is an outiside world'. This is a practical matter. Brain material
does something special...which enables an internal literal phenomenal
mapping of the universe outside the scientist. The Turing machine is a
collection of abstractions with an ASSUMED relationship to the outside
world.

Anything talking about anything supposedly outside itself makes such an assumption.



Until we know what that physics is any argument assuming the lack
of that special physics is simply going to take you down the usual
argument path of assumption.

Only when we isolate the real physics of phenomenal consciousness in brain
material can we then make any valid judgement as to its necessity in
intelligence. Until then I hole all discussion based on assumption of
computational (as-if) substrates as invalid or at least interesting but of
little practical use at this stage.


No problem.



-------------------------------------------
TURING TEST.
The turing test always infuriates me. Since when does dumbing a human down
to the point of looking like machine X prove that machine X has
consciousness? I just don't get it.


Turing was really not searching any proof there.



When you give the machine that faculties of a human and make it do what
humans do ...I I believe getting them both to do science is the
appropriate ttest... then the Turing test is a complete irrelevance based
on an assumption that the presence of the physics of phenomenal
consciousness is optional in intelligence. It is an empirical reality that
when you alter phenomenal consciousness then scientific behaviour is
altered. No further argument is needed. The turing test is not a test of
consciousness. I'm not sure what it is a test of, but it is certainly not
a test of consciousness.


I think Turing would agree here, except that it would have add that such a test is the better thing you can ever have to evaluate the plausibility of the presence of consciousness (without being influenced by the prejudices based on body shapes). I am less sure because with the technical progress only arbitrary longer test can make sense. I know someone who did took some program for a conscious being after a short "conversation" with it!

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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