Bruno wrote > Colin Geoffrey Hales a 飲it : >> 5) Re a fatal test for the Turing machine? Give it exquisite novelty by asking it to do science on an unknown area of the natural world. Proper science. It will fail because it does not know there is an outside world. > > > And you *know* that? > > We can *bet* on a independent reality, that's all. Justifiably so assuming comp, but I think you don't. > > Self-referentially correct machine can *only* bet on their > self-referential and referential correctness. > > > Bruno
I don't assume COMP. The idea that this is necessary to hold a position on anything is, for me, simply irrelevant and preumptuous that COMP is able to make any useful predictions. COMP is not an empirically supportable position, no matter how elegant it may look. I would consider it so if it could predict the existence and properties of brain material. Having said that ....yes you are right that 'betting' on an independent reality is all we can do....this is an empirical matter. Whatever it is that enables vast legions of scientists to do their job (deines their job), relentlessly for hundreds of years....that mutually eqisitely produced, shared delusion called the natural world.... that thing... that we appear to be within and constantly demonstrate it via creation of novel technology that seems to operate within it.... That is worth betting on...the process of consideration that it may not be there is of no practical value. But I'm not sure you have really 'got' what I mean by 'it does not know there is an outiside world'. This is a practical matter. Brain material does something special...which enables an internal literal phenomenal mapping of the universe outside the scientist. The Turing machine is a collection of abstractions with an ASSUMED relationship to the outside world. Until we know what that physics is any argument assuming the lack of that special physics is simply going to take you down the usual argument path of assumption. Only when we isolate the real physics of phenomenal consciousness in brain material can we then make any valid judgement as to its necessity in intelligence. Until then I hole all discussion based on assumption of computational (as-if) substrates as invalid or at least interesting but of little practical use at this stage. ------------------------------------------- TURING TEST. The turing test always infuriates me. Since when does dumbing a human down to the point of looking like machine X prove that machine X has consciousness? I just don't get it. When you give the machine that faculties of a human and make it do what humans do ...I I believe getting them both to do science is the appropriate ttest... then the Turing test is a complete irrelevance based on an assumption that the presence of the physics of phenomenal consciousness is optional in intelligence. It is an empirical reality that when you alter phenomenal consciousness then scientific behaviour is altered. No further argument is needed. The turing test is not a test of consciousness. I'm not sure what it is a test of, but it is certainly not a test of consciousness. regards Colin Hales --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
