David Nyman wrote: > On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is > > > ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how > to.So if I > > > see a square, I can't communicate it? > > You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is > information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to > instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.
I disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. > Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable, That's just my point. It's not the fact that is is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something inexpressible. > and consequently you > have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your > beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your > communication. Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation doesn't matter in that case. > David > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are > > > > > conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just that > > > > > we don't know how? > > > > > It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is > > > ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if I > > > see a square, I can't communicate it? > > > > Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? > > Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at > > least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be > > mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins > > qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those > > features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A > > red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an > > unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the > > problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are > > mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding > > issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of > > external objects. There a re "phenomenal feels" attached to emotions, > > sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of > > objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings > > towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the > > argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the > > phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of > > internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable > > external objects. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---