David Nyman wrote: > On Oct 13, 1:52 am, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is > > > information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to > > > instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I > > > disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. > > Make your mind up. You said 'see a square' not 'squareness'. > > > Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation > > doesn't matter in that case. > > Yes, fine, no problem of course, so why discuss this example?
It shows that experiences had by persons are not necessarily incommunicable. Thus, whatever the pronblem is with qualia, it is not about personhood per se. > I > specifically said '1-person experience', and in the case of 'see a > square' (your choice) let's try the hard one - i.e. communicate the > experience of seeing a particular square, not the concept of > squareness. So, for example, you can say 'look at that square', I look > at it, I see the square, I instantiate it, I have an analogous 1-person > experience. OK? > > Come to think of it, even in your example of squareness, I have to > instantiate *something*, otherwise your explanation won't register with > me. Are you sure? mathematicians can comunicate higher-dimensional spaces that they cannot visualise. > And this something is *my* private something, as it happens > *derived* from your communication - it isn't literally what you 'had in > mind', because this is private to *you*. You are playing on two senses of the "same". It may be an exact duplicate, rather than the very same individual, but if it is an *exact* duplicate,there is no incommunicability or ineffability. > Frankly, I think if you > quibble about this, you must have some other notion of 1-person in > mind. But will we ever know? > > David > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > On Oct 11, 11:17 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is > > > > > ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how > to.So > > > > > if I see a square, I can't communicate it? > > > > > You know you can, of course. But what you are communicating is > > > information derived from your 'seeing a square' in order for others to > > > instantiate something analogous, as 1-person experiences of their own.I > > > disagree. Squareness is fully expressible in language. > > > > > Your 1-person experience per se is incommunicable,That's just my point. > > > It's not the fact that is > > is an experience, or that it is had by a person that makes something > > inexpressible. > > > > > and consequently you > > > have no direct evidence of (although you may be jusified in your > > > beliefs concerning) what others have instantiated as a result of your > > > communication.Squareness is fully expressinle, so instantiation > > doesn't matter in that case. > > > > > David > > > > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > > > On Oct 11, 5:11 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > But it isn't possible to determine by inspection that they are > > > > > > > conscious.Are you claiming it's impossible in principle, or just > > > > > > > that we don't know how? > > > > > > > It may be impossible in principle (i.e. 1-person experience is > > > > > ex-hypothesi incommunicable) and we certainly don't know how to.So if > > > > > I see a square, I can't communicate it? > > > > > > Colours and Shapes: Exactly What Qualifies as a Quale ? > > > > Because qualia are so often used to argue against physicalism (or at > > > > least physical communicability), it is often assumed that they must be > > > > mysterious by definition. However Lewis's original definition pins > > > > qualia to the way external objects appear, and it least some of those > > > > features are throughly unmysterious,such as the shapes of objects. A > > > > red square seems to divide into a mysterious redness and an > > > > unmysterious squareness. This does not by itself remove any of the > > > > problems associated with qualia; the problem is that some qualia are > > > > mysterious. not that some are not.. There is another, corresponding > > > > issue; not all mysterious, mental contents are the appearances of > > > > external objects. There a re "phenomenal feels" attached to emotions, > > > > sensations and so on. Indeed, we often use the perceived qualaities of > > > > objects as metaphors for them -- sharp pains, warm or cool feelings > > > > towards another person, and so on. The main effect of this issue on the > > > > argument is to hinder the physicalist project of reducing qualia to the > > > > phsycally-defined properties of external objects, since in the case of > > > > internal sensations and emotional feelings, there are not suitable > > > > external objects. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---