David Nyman wrote: > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > If you prefer I should > > have said "associate" instead of "identifying". > > Hi Bruno, welcome back. > > The terminological distinction you now make above is important - maybe > it's another case of Franco-English faux amis (false cognates), but > when you say 'identify' I think it steers Peter (and others) towards > notions of 'reification' of number.
If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble. He might be able to reduce an existent physical universe to existent numbers, but he certainly can't reduce it to non-existstent numbers. > To 'associate' (in your sense of > point-for-point commensurability) digital machines with number is a > different matter (literally) than to 'identify' (i.e. posit an absolute > identity between) them. Yes. But if there if Platonia consist only of numbers, and it here is no-one to do the associating in Platonia, there are no machines/computations/algorithms in Platonia. > Perhaps for the future, vis-a-vis reification, we should simply > conclude, with Father Jack: "that would be an ecumenical matter"! This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of EVERYTHING? > > Computability is an absolute notion (with CT), but provability is a > > relative (with respect to a machine) notion. Put in another way: > > computations admits a universal dovetailer which generates and run all > > computations, but there is no universal dovetailer for proofs. > > Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive > computations (like the UD), not theorems. They're metaphysics. Face it. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---