David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher > > court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of > > EVERYTHING? > > Touché! > > > If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble. > > And if the materialist isn't reifying the observables, he's right in > there with him.
Obviously the materialist is reifying matter. But then we can *see* material things. Reification pers e is not the problem; the problem is reifying what is invisible/uninteractive. > Take your pick. You know I'm with you in requiring that > the underlying reality must somehow be Real In The Sense I Am Real. But > I don't know what reification has to do with it - I'm not a thing. I mean reification in the most general sense -- of having some sort of reality. > The > interesting issues here IMO are about explanatory power. For the sake > of empiricism, I hope that comp can make some predictions with respect > to the instantiation of consciousness and the 1-person that are > inconsistent with theory couched purely in terms of the 'material > observables' - i.e posit specifically how the computational emergence > of 'matter' makes an experimentally disconfirmable difference. I would > also like to understand how this differs (if indeed it does) from > computation done on 'real computers' (how I distrust this vocabulary!) > So although somehow it must all be RITSIAR all the way down, I'm > prepared to keep my counsel (sine die) as to the 'fundamental' nature > of the turtles. > > > They're metaphysics. Face it. > > Yes, of course. All such discourse is metaphysics, what else could it > be? It is a question of faith if we wish to go beyond this > acknowledgement and ascribe 'ultimate reality' in the direction of our > metaphysical gestures. When I say metaphysical, I don't mean "heopelessly insoluble". I am just expressing wariness of the idea that there is some way of reaching metaphsyical conclsuins by logical or mathematical means, that avoids the pitfalls of traditional metaphysics. > In this broad ecumenical spirit, materialism is > a metaphysics too. Of course. > But we should be no less empirically demanding with > respect to our metaphysics. Metaphysics is not, and never was, divorced from empiricism. > And we have no practical alternative (and > I'm all too aware of the irony) but to act in good faith. > > [Scene: Night-time. David is asleep and having a nightmare that he's > Father Dougal. > Dougal: "Ted, I've had an idea. We're all just a dream of the Great > Turtle!" > Ted: "Get off that bloody computer!"] > > 'night. > > D > > > David Nyman wrote: > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > > If you prefer I should > > > > have said "associate" instead of "identifying". > > > > > > Hi Bruno, welcome back. > > > > > > The terminological distinction you now make above is important - maybe > > > it's another case of Franco-English faux amis (false cognates), but > > > when you say 'identify' I think it steers Peter (and others) towards > > > notions of 'reification' of number. > > > > If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble. > > > > He might be able to reduce an existent physical universe > > to existent numbers, but he certainly can't reduce it > > to non-existstent numbers. > > > > > To 'associate' (in your sense of > > > point-for-point commensurability) digital machines with number is a > > > different matter (literally) than to 'identify' (i.e. posit an absolute > > > identity between) them. > > > > Yes. But if there if Platonia consist only of numbers, > > and it here is no-one to do the associating in Platonia, > > there are no machines/computations/algorithms in Platonia. > > > > > Perhaps for the future, vis-a-vis reification, we should simply > > > conclude, with Father Jack: "that would be an ecumenical matter"! > > > > This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher > > court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of > > EVERYTHING? > > > > > > Computability is an absolute notion (with CT), but provability is a > > > > relative (with respect to a machine) notion. Put in another way: > > > > computations admits a universal dovetailer which generates and run all > > > > computations, but there is no universal dovetailer for proofs. > > > > > > Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive > > > computations (like the UD), not theorems. > > > > They're metaphysics. Face it. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---