Hi Stathis,

I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my 
yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send 
(Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I 
will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and David).

Le 23-oct.-06, à 04:35, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

>> Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute
>> all computable functions from N to N.
>> It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does
>> not invoke physical machine at all.
> In a sense that is true, but a TM is still a model of what could 
> possibly be built
> in a physical universe such as ours. Of course the model is still 
> valid irrespective
> of the existence of a physical machine or indeed a physical universe, 
> but if you
> abandon the idea of a physical universe there is no need to constrain 
> yourself to
> models based on one.

I am not sure why you say the TM model is based on what we can build in 
the physical universe.
Both with comp and without, the physical universe is a priori far 
richer than a UTM.
The UTM of Turing relies explicitly on an analysis of human capacity 
for computations.
Post universal systems are based on analysis of mathematician 

> So I suppose the two questions I have (which you partly
> answer below) are, having arrived at step 8 of the UDA could you go 
> back and
> say that the UD is not really necessary but all the required 
> computations exist
> eternally without any generating mechanism or program (after all, you 
> make this
> assumption for the UD itself), or alternatively, could you have 
> started with step
> 8 and eliminate the need for the UD in the argument at all?

This is the way I proceed in "Conscience and Mechanism". I begin, by 
using the movie graph argument MGA,  to show that consciousness cannot 
be attached to physical activities, and then I use the UD to explain 
that the comp-physics get the form of a measure on all computations.
In my Lille thesis I do the opposite because the UDA is simpler than 
the MGA. It is not so important.
UD is needed to justify and to make mathematically precise the ontic 
3-observer moments. They correspond to its (the UD) accessible states.

>>> It seems that this is the computer you
>>> have in mind to run the UD.
>> Only for providing a decor for a story. This assumption is eliminated
>> when we arrive (step eight of UDA-8) at the conclusion that universal
>> digital machine cannot distinguish any "reality" from an arithmetical
>> one.
>>> That's OK and the argument works (assuming
>>> comp etc.), but in Platonia you have access to hypercomputers of the
>>> best
>>> and fastest kind.
>> Fastness is relative in Platonia. Universal machine can always been
>> sped up on almost all their inputs (There is a theorem by Blum and
>> Marquez to that effect). Then indeed there are the "angels" and
>> hierachies of "non-comp" machine. A vast category of "angels" can be
>> shown to have the same hypostases (so we cannot tested by empirical
>> means if we are such angels). Then they are entities very closed to 
>> the
>> "one", having stronger hypostases, i.e. you need to add axioms to G 
>> and
>> G* (or V, V* with explicit comp) to get them.
> Of course I was joking when I said "best and fastest". In Platonia 
> there is
> no actual time and everything is as fast and as perfect as you want it.

OK. But of course there exist notion of relative time: a fast Fourier 
transform is faster than a slow Fourier transform, even in Platonia. Of 
course this can be said in term of number of steps in computations (no 
need to invoke time).



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