David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. > > Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that > this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to > contradict your own experience, but I just can't see why. The crucial > point about our 1-person experience is that it's inherently > informationally self-limiting - i.e. we can only define ourselves in > terms of whatever information we have access to from a given pov.
Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they are not, it must be rejected. > And > surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple' > experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental > intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves, > informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, could equally > validly be considered clones from any given 'present' pov. I don't see how POV's can be logically prior to a space time structure. > This is why > I have previously been so insistent about the 'global' nature of the > 1-person (although I know this has led to terminological confusion). > Its 'globality' consists in the fact that *any* suitably constituted > region of reality equally partakes of this self-referential experience > of 'I'. > But the *content* of each 1-person OM is inherently limited by > its information content. Doesn't this image do the trick for you? > > > > All I know is what I am > > > experiencing *now*. > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. > > But it doesn't. What do you think you would experience in a BU > (focusing on the presence of observer moments, rather than the A-series > versus B-series issue)? A consciousness spread across time. > What process exists that could coherently > totalise or synthesise in some way the informationally separated OMs? The question is what could make the conscious one-at-a-time if not the flow of time. > You might as well say that you and I should somehow have overlapping > consciousness right now. We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not the same consciousness. > Well, we don't, because we have different > information horizons - and just *this much* information crosses these > barriers to become part of our joint conciousness. I think the analogy > is pretty direct. My future selves will contain information from my present self. But they are not conscious *yet*. > David > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no > > > > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change > > > > > > to be > > > > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in > > > > > > something. > > > > > > It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never > > > > > > change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical > > > > > > necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all > > > > > > changes > > > > > > are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself > > > > > > change and must endure through change. In more detail here > > > > > > > > > > Why must "change... be change in something"? It sort of sounds > > > > > reasonable > > > > > but it is our duty to question every assumption and weed out the > > > > > superfluous > > > > > ones. If there is an object with (space, time, colour) coordinates > > > > > (x1, t1, red) > > > > > and another object (x1, t2, orange), then we say that the object has > > > > > changed > > > > > from red to orange. > > > > > > > > If we already know what distinguishes the time co-ordinate > > > > from the space co-ordinate. What is our usual > > > > way of doing that? The time co-ordinate is the one that is always > > > > changing... > > > > > > > > Time and Possibility > > > > > > > > Imagine a universe in which there was no change, nothing actually > > > > occurs. In the absence of events, it would be imposssible to > > > > distinguish any point in timw from any other point. There would be no > > > > meaning to time -- such a universe would be timeless. > > > > Now imagine a universe which is completely chaotic. Things change so > > > > completely from one moment to the next that there are no conistent > > > > things. This universe is made up solely of events, which can be > > > > labelled with 4 coordinates . [ x,y,z,t]. But which coordinate is the > > > > time coordinate ? One could just as well say [ y,t,z,x]. In the absence > > > > of persistent ojects there is nothing to single out time as a > > > > 'direction' in a coordinate system. So again time is meaingless. > > > > > > > > In order to have a meaningful Time, you need a combination of sameness > > > > (persisitent objects) and change (events). So time is posited on being > > > > able to say: > > > > > > > > "Object A changed from state S1 at time T1 to state S2 at time T2." > > > > > > You're just stating that time is different from space. Time and space are > > > also > > > different from colour, or any other property an object may have. If we > > > didn't > > > have time there would be no change, if we didn't have height everything > > > would > > > be flat, and if we didn't have colour everything would be black. > > > > But it isn't an arbitrary difference. > > > > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a > > > > > virtual > > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, > > > > > for the sake > > > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your > > > > > conscious > > > > > experience do not need to be explicitly linked together to "flow" and > > > > > they do > > > > > not need to be explicitly separated, either in separate universes or > > > > > in separate > > > > > rooms, to be separate. > > > > > > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical > > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all > > > > mathematical > > > > structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till > > > > 1 second ago) > > > > + (purple dragons) must exist. If there is nothing > > > > mathematical to keep out of HP universe, the fact that I have never > > > > seen one is > > > > evidence against a mathematical multiverse. > > > > > > That you don't experience HP universes is as much an argument against a > > > physical > > > multiverse as it is an argument against a mathematical multiverse. > > > > Not "as much". It depends on how constrained they are. > > Physical multiverses can be almost as constrained as single universes, > > or almost as unconstrained as multiverses. > > > > > If a physical MV > > > exists, then in some branch you will encounter purple dragons in the next > > > second. > > > > With a very low measure. > > > > > The fact that you don't means that either there is no physical multiverse > > > or there is > > > a physical multiverse but the purple dragon experience is of low measure. > > > Similarly in > > > a mathematical multiverse the HP experiences may be of low measure. > > > > Physical multiversalists can choose measure to match observation (that > > is > > basically how the SWE is arrived at). Mathematical multiversalists > > cannot choose an arbitrary measure, because nothing is arbitrary or > > contingnet > > in Platonia. Measure has to emerge naturally and necessarily for them. > > > > > > > > > If you died today and just by accident a possible next > > > > > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years > > > > > in the > > > > > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in > > > > > the future. > > > > > > > > That's the whole problem. I could just as easily find myself in an HP > > > > universe. But I never do. > > > > > > Not "just as easily". If you are destructively scanned and a moment from > > > now 2 copies > > > of you are created in Moscow and 1 copy created in Washington, you have a > > > 2/3 chance > > > of finding yourself in Moscow and a 1/3 chance of finding yourself in > > > Washington. > > > > What's that got to do with Platonia? Platonia contains every > > configuration of matter. > > (Snd no time). Configurations where I'm in Moscow, configurations where > > I'm in Washington, > > configurations where I'm on the moon, configurations where I'm in > > Narnia. > > There is no unaccountable fact to the effect that there is 1 copy of me > > in Moscow, > > 2 in Washington, and 0 on the moon. There are no random gaps in > > Platonia. > > > > (That's the "mathematical* mutiverse of course. A physical mutliverse > > is an entirely different matter). > > > > > It is a > > > real problem to explain why the HP universes are less likely to be > > > experienced than the > > > orderly ones (see chapter 4.2 of Russell Standish' book for a summary of > > > some of the > > > debates on this issue), but it is not any more of a problem for a > > > mathematical as opposed > > > to a physical multiverse. > > > > Not at all. P-multiversalists can and do choose measure to match > > observation. > > > > > > > But if you had the successive moments of your consciousness > > > > > implemented > > > > > in parallel, perhaps as a simulation on a powerful computer, it would > > > > > be impossible > > > > > to tell that this was the case. For all you are aware, there may not > > > > > *be* any past > > > > > moments: your present experience may include false memories of your > > > > > past, and > > > > > whole world may have been created a second ago. > > > > > > > > A simulation running on a computer is still a dynamic, temporal > > > > process. The point is that the passage of > > > > time tells me that I am not in Platonia. > > > > > > > > > > > > Time Capsules: Getting Flow from Sequence. > > > > > > > > Proponents of the Block Universe view believe that there is only a > > > > B-Series. Some think that alone is adequate to explain the subjective > > > > Flow-of-Time. It is easy enough to see how there could be a sequence in > > > > the B series. If we consider a series of 3 dimensional "snapshots" of > > > > someone's brain, each subsequent snapshot iwll contain information > > > > relating back to previous ones. > > > > But is this chain or sequence enough to establish flow ? A B-series > > > > without an A-series is like a spatial series. If you had a series of > > > > clones arranged spatially so that clone 2 has all of clone 1's memories > > > > (and more), clone 3 has all of clone 2's memories (and more) and so on, > > > > you would not expect anything to be flowing from one clone to another. > > > > The clones form a series of "time capsules", and a such they have a > > > > natural sequence, but that is all. > > > > Without an A series, there is nothing to justify the idea that only one > > > > time capsule is conscious "at a time". Either they all are, or none > > > > are. We know we are conscious, so we must reject the "none are" option. > > > > The Block Universe therefore predicts that all time capsules are > > > > conscious. This is in line with the way the Block Universe spatialises > > > > Time. It predicts that consciousness is a single 4-dimensional entity. > > > > I would not just be conscious now with memories of the past, I would > > > > have a consciousness in the past overlaid on my present consciousness. > > > > > > Whether the Block Universe model is right or not, the series of clones you > > > describe, set up as an experiment, would still give the experience of > > > being > > > continuously conscious through time. > > > > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem > > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously. > > > > > I remember being conscious a second > > > ago but how could I possibly know that I didn't just pop into existence > > > complete with false memories half a second ago? > > > > That isn't the problem. The problem is that if time is just like > > space, as the BU theory states, you should have single consciousness > > spread across time, not a temporal sequence of one-at-a-time > > conscious states. > > > > > All I know is what I am > > > experiencing *now*. > > > > Yes. That is the phenomenological fact that contradicts the BU. > > > > > It is only because I have memories and a sense of being > > > the same person over time that I consider it was "I" who woke up this > > > morning > > > and it will be "I" again who goes to bed tonight. I don't have a direct > > > telepathic > > > link to past or future selves, or copies in the next room, to ensure that > > > they are > > > "really me". All I have to go on are my present memories and beliefs, > > > which could > > > in theory be artificially implanted without changing anything about my > > > stream of > > > consciousness. Nothing is changed if we say that we live only > > > transiently, and the > > > feeling that we persist as individuals through time is an illusion. > > > > > > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > _________________________________________________________________ > > > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > > > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---