1Z wrote:
> Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be > contained > in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness > supervenes on a process, > however that assumption is not true. As you know I've been attempting to give an account of this. I concur that BU theories do appear to entail what you say above, when you strip out implicit question-begging reliance on 'continuity'. Consequently, in a BU, conscious 'temporal' sequences must be represented *structurally* by some sort of compresent 'time capsule' approach (following Barbour). We then have to account for the appearance of 'process' - i.e. dynamic differentiation in experience - and so far you've made no comment about my attempts to give an account of this, which I admit are a bit weird, though possibly insufficiently so. David > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > > Here is another thought experiment. You are watching an object > > > > > > moving against a > > > > > > stationary background at a velocity of 10 m/s. Suddenly, the object > > > > > > seems to instantly > > > > > > jump 10 metres in the direction of motion, and then continues as > > > > > > before at 10 m/s. You > > > > > > are informed that one of the following three events has taken place: > > > > > > > > > > > > (a) your consciousness was suspended for 1 second, as in an absence > > > > > > seizure; > > > > > > > > > > > > (b) you were scanned, annihilated, and a perfect copy created in > > > > > > your place 1 second > > > > > > later; > > > > > > > > > > > > (c) nothing unusual happened to you, but the object you were > > > > > > watching was instantly > > > > > > teleported 10 metres in the direction of motion. > > > > > > > > > > > > Would you be able to guess which of the three events took place? > > > > > > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > > > > > > > Sure, it was (a). (c) violates the laws of physics. (b) might or > > > > > might not be theoretically possible, but it's practically impossible. > > > > > > > > OK, you would probably be right if you were kidnapped and subjected to > > > > this experiment > > > > tomorrow. But it's a thought experiment, and my point is that from your > > > > conscious > > > > experience alone you would be unable to distinguish between the three > > > > cases. Peter Jones' > > > > posts seem to imply that you would notice a difference. > > > > > > You have to say that, given a particular theory of consciousness, > > > would you notice a difference. If physical counterfactuals/causality > > > is important, you could in cases a) and b), since they > > > all involve an abnormal causal transition from one OM to > > > then next. Given computationalism, it is less straightforward. > > > > The question is independent of your theory of consciousness. Say > > consciousness > > is based on process C. I trust you will assume that process C is entirely > > physical, but > > suppose it involves God animating your brain with his breath. Then in case > > (a) God stops > > breathing for a second, in case (b) God destroys you and makes a perfect > > copy which he > > reanimates a second later, and case (c) is unchanged. The important point > > is, when you > > are destroyed then rebuilt, the new version of you is perfectly identical > > to the original and > > functions exactly the same as the original would have. It seems to me > > *logically* impossible > > that you could distinguish between the three cases. > > Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be > contained > in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness > supervenes on a process, > however that assumption is not true. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
