David Nyman wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > > Assuming that everything necessary for consciousness at time can be > > contained > > in a 0-duration snapshot at time t. However, If consciousness > > supervenes on a process, > > however that assumption is not true. > > As you know I've been attempting to give an account of this. I concur > that BU theories do appear to entail what you say above, when you strip > out implicit question-begging reliance on 'continuity'.
What do you mean by "what you say above" "That everything necessary for consciousness at time can be contained in a 0-duration snapshot at time t."? or "That everything necessary for consciousness at time can NOT be contained in a 0-duration snapshot at time t."? > Consequently, > in a BU, conscious 'temporal' sequences must be represented > *structurally* by some sort of compresent 'time capsule' approach > (following Barbour). I'm still not sure what you are saying here. But note that it is perfectly possible for a high-level property to supervene on, and only on, a spatially unlocalised state-of-affairs. Since BU's treat time like space, it is at least possible for consciousness to supervene on, and only on, temporally extended segments of the block. > We then have to account for the appearance of > 'process' - i.e. dynamic differentiation in experience - and so far > you've made no comment about my attempts to give an account of this, > which I admit are a bit weird, though possibly insufficiently so. > > David > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
