Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> We've debated whether a computer, a recording, the computations in Platonia > etc. can be conscious, but I think we can almost all agree on at least this > minimal > functionalism: that if you could copy a person by placing all the atoms in > position > accurately enough, then you would end up with a person who looked, behaved, > thought just like the original, had all the original's memories, and > identified as being > the original. After all, this sort of thing is happening in our bodies all > the time as bits > break off cells and are replaced by identical (or near-identical) parts > manufactured by > the automated cellular repair mechanisms. If you accept this idea that the > brain is just > a complex machine, I don't see how it is even *logically* possible that a > copy of a person > made mid-thought would not experience continuity of consciousness, provided > of course > that the technical problems could be overcome and the copy was sufficiently > accurate. > It would be like expecting that a perfect copy of an electronic calculator in > the middle of > multiplying two numbers would somehow forget what it was doing, or a perfect > copy of a > mechanical clock would show a different time or run at a different rate. > > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d The copying process would have to include some dynamic information, information about how the physical state is evolving. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
